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INTRODUCTION  
The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. The 
regime, such as it is, emerged in the late twentieth century, anchored in 
institutions dominated by the Group of Seven (G-7) wealthy nations,1 and has 
shaped responses to dozens of international financial crises. All along, it drew 
criticism for failing to deliver enough relief or fair distribution; it prevailed 
nonetheless in good part because “[f]or 30 years sovereign debt restructurings 
have gotten done.” 2  Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ 
 
∗ Georgetown Law and Peterson Institute for International Economics. I am grateful to Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky, Thomas M. Callaghy, Matthias Goldmann, Mitu Gulati, Sean Hagan, Simon Johnson, 
Yuefen Li, Ugo Panizza, Andrew Powell, Brad Setser, Michele Shannon, Lawrence H. Summers, Edwin 
M. Truman, Angel Ubide, Mark Weidemaier, Steven R. Weisman, Martin Weiss and Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer for helpful insights and comments, and especially for our sometimes-vigorous 
disagreements. I owe thanks to Marylin Raisch, Thanh Nguyen, Nicholas Brock, Alexander Dunn, Ron 
Havas, Kyle Henne, Julie Hwang, Sohee Rho, Alex Severance and Maria Sokolova for patient research 
assistance. This essay benefited from the author’s participation in the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development initiatives on sovereign borrowing and debt restructuring, and in the U.S. Treasury 
working group on contract reform (both described in Part IV, neither responsible for the views expressed 
here), as well as from presentations at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, College de 
France, Columbia University, the Centre for International Governance Innovation-TEPAV/Think-20, 
University of Munich/CESIfo, Imperial College, London, Boalt Hall School of Law, and the UN 
General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes. 
 1. The Group of Seven (G-7) comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
 2. Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Legal Context, in SOVEREIGN RISK: 
A WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS? BIS PAPERS NO. 72 107, 110 (July 2013), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72.pdf. For evidence that debt relief comes too late and delivers 
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weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to 
take over or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime 
from the moment it came together in the mid-1990s, so that by 2016, its 
survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine 
since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. 
Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted 
restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on 
national courts to intervene in disputes that they are ill-suited to resolve. 
Lengthy debt crises bring deadweight losses, but they also 
disproportionately hurt the poorest, least sophisticated debtors and creditors.3 
These ultimate stakeholders of any sovereign debt restructuring regime—
citizens, taxpayers, bank depositors and pensioners—lose their livelihoods 
along with their faith in domestic and international institutions.4 Governments 
lose their capacity to meet the basic human needs of their citizens and to 
safeguard their human rights. 
Initiatives emanating from places as different as the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA)5 reveal broad-based demand 
for reform. The regime’s apparent decline presents an opportunity to reconsider 
the institutional architecture of sovereign debt restructuring, along with the 
norms and alliances it reflects. I argue that reform should have three objectives, 
addressing the old flaws and the new challenges. First, the reformed regime 
should achieve sustainable outcomes generally accepted as fair. It should 
deliver a fresh start for debtors and finality for creditors, and treat similarly 
situated debtors and creditors alike. Second, to that end, the restructuring 
process should be comprehensive and collective. Third, this regime should be 
intelligible and accountable to all stakeholders. While overnight transformation 
is not in the cards, even partial and incremental reforms should be evaluated 
 
too little relief, see Rodrigo Mariscal et al., Sovereign Defaults: Has the Current System Resulted in 
Lasting (Re)Solutions? (Escuela de Negocios: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Working Paper 03/2015, 
2015), http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/udtwpbsdt/2015-03.htm; LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., BROOKINGS 
INST., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POL’Y & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 5-14 (2013), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/sovereign-debt (follow “Download the full report” 
hyperlink under “Download”) [hereinafter REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY]; Elena Duggar, 
Sovereign Defaults Series: The Aftermath of Sovereign Defaults, Moody’s (Oct. 2013); Udaibir S. Das, 
Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature 
Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND 
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 50-53 (2006) (summarizing economic literature on deadweight 
losses from sovereign debt default); Peter Fallon & Robert Lucas, The Impact of Financial Crises on 
Labor Markets, Household Incomes, and Poverty: A Review of Evidence, 17 WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER 21, 21-45 (2002); 2 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Introduction to DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: COUNTRY STUDIES—ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, MEXICO 19-24 
(Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1990) (describing the distributional effect of debt crises). 
 4. Cf. Armin von Bogdandy & Matthias Goldmann, Sovereign Debt Restructurings as 
Exercises of International Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign Insolvency Law, in 
SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE 
SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 39 (Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky eds., 
2013) (arguing that the effects of sovereign debt restructuring fall on the public and should be governed 
by public law). 
 5. See infra notes 211-213 and the accompanying text. 
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based on how well they advance the three objectives. 
This essay proceeds as follows: Parts I and II review existing institutions 
for sovereign debt restructuring and the trends that have destabilized them. Part 
III considers three recent shocks—Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine—and what 
they reveal about the regime. Part IV outlines a set of contractual, statutory, and 
institutional measures to promote sustainable and fair outcomes, a 
comprehensive, collective, intelligible institutional framework, and an 
accountable process. I argue for more robust links among restructuring fora to 
deter free-riding, improve enforcement and generate shared norms, for stronger 
industry governance, including more contract standardization, and for richer, 
more standardized and accessible disclosure to promote accountability. The 
thrust of the argument is that any new regime, much like the old, is more likely 
to take hold and endure if it solves concrete problems for its diverse 
constituents, who understand it and have a stake in its success. On their own, 
each of the proposed reforms might look like a small-bore; this is misleading. 
The reform package as a whole is designed to build an infrastructure for 
repeated collaboration, and to infuse big ideas like sustainability and fairness 
with consensus meaning and normative pull from shared practice. It is 
consistent with the 2015 UNGA Resolution establishing basic principles for 
sovereign debt restructuring,6 and harnesses existing institutions—the IMF, 
national courts, industry and civil society groups, and market infrastructure—to 
advance them. 
I. FIN DE SOMETHING: SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING CIRCA 2000 
Any sovereign debt restructuring regime must account for two distinctive 
features of sovereign debt that are so well-rehearsed in the academic literature 
that they no longer strike anyone as weird.7 First, the debt contracts are 
unenforceable in any conventional sense.8 Short of gunboats, there are few 
ways for creditors to make governments pay. Despite the dramatic erosion of 
sovereign immunity over the course of the twentieth century, foreign courts 
normally cannot seize public property, liquidate a country, or compel public 
officials to do their bidding.9 Second, the debt does not go away. Governments 
have no access to bankruptcy relief, partly because none would submit to a 
binding process beyond their control. 10  While occasional default and 
 
 6. G.A. Res. 69/319 (Sept. 10, 2015). 
 7. I elaborate on the peculiar nature of unenforceable-yet-nondischargeable debt in Anna 
Gelpern, Policy Brief 13-21: Sovereign Damage Control, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (May 2013). 
 8. For canonical accounts, see Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential 
Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUDIES 289 (1981) (reputation); 
Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43 
(1989) and Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. 
POLIT. ECON. 155 (1989) (enforcement); MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007) (reputation). 
 9. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
67 (2014); Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does Customary International Law Change? 
The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209 (2014). 
 10. See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 346-47, 352, 391 n. 250 (2005); Jérôme Sgard, How the IMF Did It—Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Between 1970 and 1989, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 103 (2016). 
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restructuring inhere in sovereign commitment, there is no debt discharge, no 
fresh start as a matter of right; as a result, debt relief has come from bargaining 
between a government and its creditors. 11  This tension between weak 
enforcement and no discharge frames sovereign borrowing ex ante and 
sovereign debt restructuring ex post. 
Twentieth century restructuring institutions partly overcame the 
enforcement constraint by controlling borrowing governments’ access to 
external financing.12 More than asset seizures, debtors had to worry about 
getting cut off from public and private sources of foreign exchange.13 To 
recover from an immune debtor, creditors had to stick together. A mix of 
regulatory, reputational, and contract tools to promote inter-creditor 
cooperation emerged in response to particular historical problems. 
Changes in international trade and capital flows, the decline of absolute 
sovereign immunity, post-colonial and post-Soviet upheavals each periodically 
called for new debt management and restructuring tools, and forced the old 
ones to adapt. Growth in bilateral trade finance from the rubble of World War 
II created demand for coordination among government-to-government 
creditors. The Paris Club, a regular informal gathering of official bilateral 
creditors, was born in the 1950s.14 The 1970s saw a spike in syndicated loans 
to poor and middle-income countries, made by banks in major financial centers. 
The crises and restructurings that followed in the 1980s required a mechanism 
to coordinate commercial banks. Bank advisory committees, or the London 
Club process, emerged in response.15 G-7 finance officials were just backstage 
with moral suasion, funding and regulatory incentives, because the health of 
their financial systems depended on the success of the process: banks took 
nearly a decade to build up enough capital and reserves to absorb losses from 
debt reduction.16 Meanwhile, sovereign debt kept growing.17 
 
 11. Even in his advocacy of debt repayment, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that 
repayment in full and on time is sometimes impossible and inadvisable. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
FIRST REPORT ON PUBLIC CREDIT (1790) (“Every breach of the public engagements, whether from 
choice or necessity, is, in different degrees, hurtful to public credit. When such a necessity does truly 
exist, the evils of it are only to be palliated by a scrupulous attention, on the part of the Government, to 
carry the violation no further than the necessity absolutely requires, and to manifest, if the nature of the 
case admit of it, a sincere disposition to make reparation whenever circumstances shall permit.”). 
 12. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text [Cross-Conditionality and Inter-Group 
Discipline]; see also, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2. 
 13. The mechanism could be either reputation (no new lending) or enforcement (blocked 
payments). In either case, defaulting sovereigns face disruptions in cross-border trade and financial 
flows, supra note 8; see, e.g., Willem Buiter & Ebrahim Rahbari, Why do Governments Default, and 
Why Don’t They Default More Often? 28, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9492 (May 2013) (discussing 
liquidity shocks in countries with debt denominated in foreign currency). 
 14. THOMAS M. CALLAGHY, THE MISUNDERSTOOD ORIGINS OF THE PARIS CLUB (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 15. José Antonio Ocampo traces some of the same history, with an emphasis on the booms and 
busts in different forms of lending to sovereigns, but argues that the accretion of institutions to 
restructure sovereign debt to different creditors resulted in a “non-system.” José Antonio Ocampo, A 
Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument, in TOO 
LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 189-195 (Martin Guzman, José 
Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., 2016). See also, LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN 
DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD-HOC MACHINERY 95-131 (2003) (describing the London Club process). 
 16. WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED 72-73 (1995) (describing 
changes in the financial position of banks and developing country debt stocks throughout the 1980s); 
Ocampo, supra note 15; RIEFFEL, supra note 15. See also, JOSEPH KRAFT, THE MEXICAN RESCUE 
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Starting in 1989, banks exchanged unpayable loans for tradable bonds at 
a discount. Developing countries reduced their debt to foreign banks by a third 
or more.18 Bonds quickly eclipsed loans as the funding instrument of choice 
for sovereigns, as they had been in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.19 Defaults returned to the sovereign bond market in the late 1990s, 
and called for bondholder coordination.20 Designing the right coordination 
machinery was a challenge because late twentieth-century bonds traded more 
widely and actively than their ancestors, and because modern-day bondholders 
did not normally have enduring ties to governments. Creditor committees, 
which had led bond restructuring negotiations a century earlier and commercial 
bank negotiations a decade earlier, have played a limited role in contemporary 
bond exchanges. For the most part in the late 1990s and early 2000s, debtors 
and their advisers drove distressed sovereign bond exchanges, which resembled 
new securities offerings more than the deals brokered by bank advisory 
committees or bondholder councils of yore.21 
Chronically poor countries cut off from private markets borrowed instead 
from governments and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World 
Bank, and regional development banks. Many of the economic reform and 
development programs financed with foreign official credits failed to deliver 
thanks to some combination of bad design, bad implementation, and bad luck. 
By the late 1990s, some countries’ debts had grown and their economies had 
deteriorated so much that stretching out repayments (rescheduling) and even 
substantial debt reduction by Paris Club creditors could not put them on a 
sustainable path: their debts would keep growing in perpetuity. In response to a 
global civil society campaign, the G-7 unveiled newly dedicated debt relief 
programs, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996 and 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. Throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s, a mix of outside pressure, creditor country politics, new 
 
(1984) (a journalistic account of the early days of the Third World Debt Crisis and the bank coordination 
process). For a description of sovereign debt restructuring as a three-party negotiation including the 
debtor, the creditor, and creditors’ governments, see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral 
Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework, 35 IMF 
STAFF PAPERS 644 (1988). 
 17. CLINE, supra note 16. 
 18. See, e.g., Serkan Arslanalp & Peter Blair Henry, Is Debt Relief Efficient?, 60 J. Fin. 1017 
(2005). 
 19. Ross Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading From 
1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802, 1804-18, 1820-22 (1997). 
 20. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Restructuring Sovereign 
Debt: Lessons from Recent History, in FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY 
RESPONSES 593 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2014). 
 21. For accounts of bondholder committees in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see 
Marc Flandreau, Sovereign States, Bondholders Committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the 
Nineteenth Century (1827–68): New Facts and Old Fictions, 29 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 668 (2013); 
and Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57 (1995). 
On the development of contemporary sovereign bond restructuring practices, see NOURIEL ROUBINI & 
BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
(2004); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 3; Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon & Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, The Problem that Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings (IMF, 
Working Paper No. WP/11/265, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11265.pdf; 
Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign 
Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 651 (2009). 
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research and policy experience prompted a succession of program changes to 
deliver more relief in exchange for more reform. Multilateral debt of the 
world’s poorest countries eventually would be cut for the first time alongside 
bilateral debt, with relief tied to policy and governance conditionality.22 
Different fora, practices, and techniques—the Paris and London Clubs, 
bond exchanges, HIPC and MDRI—could be mixed and matched to suit 
particular debtors, creditors, and debt stocks. By the late 1990s, sovereign debt 
restructuring was the work of a reasonably integrated regime, even if it was not 
recognized as such. 
The IMF established itself as the foundation of this restructuring regime 
beginning in the 1980s.23 It delivered temporary liquidity for the debtor and 
used its lending instruments and policies to nudge disparate creditor groups to 
coordinate. By the turn of the century, this role was well-understood by a small 
core of repeat players: finance officials in debtor and creditor countries, staff 
and management at multilateral institutions, experts at credit rating agencies, 
big law and financial firms, and smaller, specialized investors.24 A country that 
could not pay its debt first turned to the IMF, which typically offered financial 
support for up to three years, conditioned on economic reform.25 The IMF 
indicated what budget savings the country could achieve, which implied a 
“financing gap” to be filled by new lending and debt relief from other creditors. 
By default, the IMF also became a gatekeeper: if the gap could not be filled, the 
program could not go forward. Without IMF funding, the country and its 
creditors faced the prospect of disorderly default.26 
For debtors and creditors, there were few good alternatives to negotiation. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, national courts chipped away at sovereign 
 
 22. Technically, the debt was paid off on the debtors’ behalf by donor countries. Martin A. 
Weiss, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, CRS Report No. 22534 (Jun. 11, 2012), Martin A Weiss, 
Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL33073 (Apr. 
18, 2006); NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD TO 
A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE (2002); IMF, Factsheet: The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (updated 
Sep. 17, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm; IMF, Factsheet: Debt Relief Under 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (updated Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm; Joshua Busby, Is There a Constituency for Global 
Poverty? Jubilee 2000 and the Future of Development Advocacy, in GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 2.0: CAN 
PHILANTHROPISTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE POOR MAKE POVERTY HISTORY? 85 (Lael Brainard & Derek 
Chollet eds., 2008). 
 23. Sgard puts the start of this role for the IMF in the 1970s; it developed more fully during 
the Third World Debt Crisis in the 1980s. Sgard, supra note 10. 
 24. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006) (an interview-based study of sovereign bond contract reform, describing 
different parts of the sovereign debt restructuring community); MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 
3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012) (describing 
and interviewing lawyers in New York and London); cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, 
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10 (1996) (describing the tightly-knit international arbitration 
community). 
 25. Lee Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 333 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 341-42. Buchheit points out that this IMF role was not well understood by the private 
sector. While this may have been true of the private sector in general or investor groups new to the 
sovereign debt restructuring scene, it was not true of insiders like him, who numbered in the dozens. 
Supra note 25. Ocampo argues that outright defaults in the interwar periods led to better economic 
outcomes for the borrowing countries than the managed restructuring process described here. Ocampo, 
supra note 15. 
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borrowers’ defenses to paying their debts.27 Yet most government property 
remained beyond creditors’ reach, either safe inside debtors’ borders or covered 
by still-potent central bank, military and diplomatic immunities. 28 
Governments that could not or would not pay their foreign creditors had to 
choose between compromise and a lifetime of hiding assets and rerouting 
payments, which made it hard to pursue international trade and finance.29 
Meanwhile, creditors with judgments against sovereigns could spend years 
scouring the world for morsels of attachable property and hassling debtors into 
settlement. A scant few could play this game; hardly anyone else found it 
appealing.30 
The old regime as described so far had three key features that helped it 
manage sovereign debt distress just well enough to survive in a world without 
statutory, court-supervised bankruptcy, robust contract enforcement, or strong 
shared norms. It was modular, relied on cross-conditionality among creditor 
groups, and featured repeat players invested in its practices. I discuss them in 
turn below. 
 A. Modularity and Intra-Group Discipline  
 Creditors with common interests and similar claims restructured together, 
in more-or-less self-contained groups, which could be assembled in a modular 
fashion to produce a mix of reform and relief—like a building out of Lego 
blocks (Figure 1). 
Paris Club and London Club lenders, foreign bondholders, multilateral 
institutions, and domestic residents each had distinct motives for lending, and 
distinct sources of legal, political, and economic leverage over the sovereign. 
For example, bilateral and multilateral creditors lent above all to advance 
policy objectives; they relied on diplomatic and institutional pressure to collect. 
Foreign commercial banks generally lent for profit, but often had a complex 
web of dealings with a sovereign borrower, and optimized returns across the 
relationship. A bank might arrange loans for a sovereign to gain regulatory 
favors for its branch network in the country, even if it lost money on the 
loans.31  Banks could take their contracts to court, or draw on ties with 
 
 27. For U.S. jurisprudence, see, for example, Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) 
(U.S. courts have jurisdiction over domestic-law bonds payable in New York; debt issuance is 
commercial activity outside the scope of sovereign immunity); Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito 
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) (eliminating the Act of State Doctrine as a defense to 
sovereign default); and Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) (effectively 
eliminating the champerty defense in sovereign debt). 
 28. The “ARA Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, 12 
ITLOS Rep. 332, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.12 
.2012.corr.pdf. 
 29. Compare stylized description of enforcement in Bulow & Rogoff, Is to Forgive to Forget 
and A Constant Recontracting Model, supra note 8. 
 30. For game-theoretic analysis of sovereign debt restructuring episodes, see, for example, 
VINOD K. AGGARWAL, DEBT GAMES: STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL DEBT 
RESCHEDULING (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 15 at 38 (“Accordingly, banks have a ‘relationship’ interest 
in sovereign borrowers that is totally absent among bond investors. Banks may participate in a loan to a 
sovereign borrower, even when the prospective return is not commensurate with the risk, if they can 
gain a business advantage by doing so”); see also, Charles Lipson, Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private 
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regulators in their own and debtor countries to boost recovery. Non-bank 
bondholders as a rule sought to profit from the bonds, not the relationships. 
They had fewer non-contractual means to recover, and correspondingly fewer 
inhibitions about suing sovereigns. This did not necessarily make litigation the 
default option. In distress, bondholders tended to sell or settle, not sue, because 
suing immune sovereigns was time-consuming, uncertain, expensive, and 
inconsistent with most funds’ investment strategies.32 Lastly, domestic banks, 
pension funds and insurance firms sometimes lent to the sovereign under direct 
or implicit pressure.33 In crisis, they bargained over their share of pain from 
austerity (“adjustment”) policies alongside other domestic interest groups; their 
fate would depend in important part on domestic politics. 
Creditor groups also operated under distinct regulatory, tax and 
accounting constraints. At one extreme, sovereign debtors could simply change 
their own regulations to make local banks and pension funds buy their debt. 
Foreign governments and banks (foreign and domestic) could keep distressed 
sovereign loans on their books at full value under financial reporting rules 
applicable to them. Government accounting let some official bilateral creditors 
reschedule payments and reduce interest rates without booking losses or getting 
new legislative authority.34 This created a bias against principal reduction. 
Regulatory accounting created a similar bias for banks. 35  In contrast, 
investment funds typically had to value cash flows and report the market value 
of their assets; when they “marked to market,” funds felt the impact of 
sovereign distress in real time. These and similar background constraints 
affected creditor groups’ willingness to restructure, as well as their preferences 
for restructuring terms. 
Similarly situated creditors bargained together and exerted a measure of 
intra-group discipline.36 They insisted on high or total participation among 
 
Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 200, 207 (Kenneth 
A. Oye ed., 1986); Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1058-59 (2004). 
 32. See ROSS BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET 294-95 (J.J. Norton & Christos Hadjiemmanuil eds., 1999). 
 33. See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government Debt 
(IMF, Working Paper No. WP/15/7, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1507.pdf. 
Of course, so-called financial repression is not the only or even the dominant reason domestic actors 
lend to their governments—they can make bad credit judgments just as well as foreign creditors. 
 34. RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 278-79 (describing legislative constraints on principal reduction 
by the U.S. government). 
 35. See, e.g., Jonathan Hay & Nirmaljit Paul, Regulation and Taxation of International 
Commercial Banks During Debt Crisis  (World Bank Technical Paper No. 158), http://www-wds 
.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/23/000178830_9810190414145
7/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
 36. The Paris Club is the most obvious example of a “creditor cartel.” Member governments 
negotiate together and police compliance through regular meetings and monitoring within the group. See 
Historical Development, CLUB DE PARIS, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/page 
/historical-development (last visited Apr. 27, 2016). Group discipline became a challenge in bank 
syndicates when small banks refused to grant repeated concessions on par with larger banks that had 
higher exposure and a broader set of equities at stake in a sovereign crisis. Buckley, supra note 19, at 
1802; see also 3 Robert S. Dohner & Ponciano Intal, Jr., Debt Crisis and Adjustment, in DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: COUNTRY STUDIES—INDONESIA, KOREA, 
PHILIPPINES, TURKEY 544 (Jeffrey D. Sachs & Susan M. Collins eds., 1989). Bond exchanges presented 
the biggest challenge, since the creditors were not necessarily repeat players and were not subject to 
regulatory suasion. Transactional techniques such as exit consents and minimum participation thresholds 
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members as a condition for restructuring, and devised ways to make freeriding 
unattractive.37 When holdouts were small, the group might move on and settle 
with the debtor. This would deprive the holdout of group negotiating power; 
however, it also freed the debtor to pay off the holdouts quietly once the other 
creditors were out of the way. On occasion, large creditors paid off small 
holdouts in secret, so as not to encourage imitators.38 
In sum, the existence of reasonably cohesive modules, or groups of 
creditors with shared motives and constraints facilitated collective action 
among individual creditors, and negotiations between all creditors and the 
sovereign debtor, so that “deals got done.” 
B. Cross-Conditionality and Inter-Group Discipline  
A regime capable of brokering agreements within creditor modules still 
had to manage the problem of burden-sharing among them, and had to secure 
enough relief overall to revive the sovereign. With no ability to consolidate 
diverse claims in a single bankruptcy-style proceeding, sovereign debt 
restructuring fora used cross-conditionality to achieve more comprehensive, 
collective workouts. 
IMF policies put pressure on debtors and creditors to settle, and on 
creditor groups to coordinate. As noted earlier, the IMF would not approve a 
program without assurances from the sovereign or directly from its creditors 
that there would be enough financing to meet the country’s expected needs 
during the program period. IMF-supported program conditions also secured 
contributions from domestic creditors as part of the sovereign’s adjustment 
program, whether or not they participated in debt restructuring alongside the 
foreign creditors. The IMF’s avowed role was to ensure that a comprehensive 
combination of reform, relief, and new money was in place, and that it was 
workable. The Fund supplied the analytical frame, assessed performance, and 
enforced it with its own lending. 
The Paris Club required the debtor to seek “comparability of treatment” 
from its other public and private foreign creditors.39 As the term suggests, 
comparability was not equality—it was burden-sharing adequate to allay 
economic and political concerns about free riding on Paris Club countries’ 
taxpayers. A sovereign that failed to get “comparable” terms from other 
creditors risked derailing its Paris Club agreement. While comparability was 
interpreted flexibly, few debtors or creditors were willing to sacrifice an IMF 
program or Paris Club relief. 
Cross-conditionality could be tightened or relaxed to adjust negotiating 
incentives. For example, until 1989, the IMF would not finance countries in 
 
reduced the number of dissenters. Bi et al., supra note 21. 
 37. See Bi et al., supra note 21 (describing exit consents and minimum participation 
thresholds, as well as majority amendment clauses in sovereign bonds, to explain the brisk pace of bond 
restructurings) 
 38. Lee C. Buchheit, Making Amends for Amendments, 10 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 11 (1991) 
(describing the rise of small bank holdouts in syndicated loan restructuring in the late 1980s). 
 39. What does Comparability of Treatment Mean?, CLUB DE PARIS, http://www.clubdeparis 
.org/en/communications/page/what-does-comparability-of-treatment-mean (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
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arrears to other foreign creditors.40 This policy put pressure on sovereign 
debtors to stay current on their payments. When the IMF first decided to “lend 
into arrears”—finance governments in default on their bank loans—it loosened 
the ties with the London Club process, and gave debtors more negotiating 
leverage. The arrears policy was extended to bonds a decade later. Banks and 
bondholders that would not compromise now ran a higher risk of default; 
however, debtors still had to comply with IMF economic reform conditions and 
collaborate with creditors in good faith to receive IMF funds. The good faith 
criterion slightly offset debtors’ gains from the arrears policy, and implicitly 
inserted the IMF as an arbiter into the negotiation process.41 
Negotiation sequencing worked as a form of cross-conditionality. The 
Paris Club did not agree to grant relief until the debtor secured an IMF 
program. Private creditors were expected to finalize their terms after the IMF 
and the Paris Club.42 This way, they would know what official creditors had 
done, and what everyone else was expected to deliver for the program to go 
forward. Although the sequencing practice began to break down with the 
advent of bond restructuring in the late 1990s, the underlying principle survived 
well into the 2000s: private creditors were free to maximize recovery so long as 
the IMF got its financing assurances and the Paris Club its comparability. 
Different forms of cross-conditionality worked well enough together to 
assure creditor groups that the others were not free-riding on their concessions. 
Cross-conditionality was flexible enough to accommodate diverse stakeholders 
and diverse visions of inter-creditor equity. Each group negotiated within its 
unique parameters, so long as the others did not walk away or revolt over the 
result. Some contributed debt stock relief, others settled for reduced payment 
flows, yet others lent new money. Each creditor group could judge the fairness 
of the outcome for itself. 
The modular sovereign debt restructuring regime did not reflect a general 
consensus on priorities and distribution. If a deal stood, it was “fair enough” for 
all practical purposes, though not necessarily fair or just by any shared 
standard. This attribute of the sovereign restructuring regime stands in contrast 
to domestic statutory bankruptcy. Although people find plenty to fight about in 
corporate and personal debt restructuring, the mere existence of a statutory 
framework and a judiciary to enforce it reflects a measure of agreement within 
a political system about distributing losses from a member’s insolvency. Not so 
in sovereign debt.43 
 
 40. JAMES M. BOUGHTON, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
1979-1989, at 477-537 (2001) (describing the context for the emergence of the IMF’s arrears policy); 
see also IMF Executive Board, Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official 
Creditors 6-11 (Oct. 15, 2015) (describing the process by which IMF staff obtained financing assurances 
from government creditors). 
 41. IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors—Further Considerations 
of the Good Faith Criterion 3–9 (July 30, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002 
.pdf (reviewing the development of IMF policy on arrears) [hereinafter IMF Lending into Arrears 2002]; 
BOUGHTON, supra note 40; see also Lee C. Buchheit & Rosa M. Lastra, Lending into Arrears—A Policy 
Adrift, 41 INT’L LAW. 939 (2007). 
 42. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & NOURIEL ROUBINI, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 213 (Martin Feldstein ed., 2003). 
 43. See e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial 
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Figure 1 is a stylized depiction of the modular, cross-conditional 
sovereign debt restructuring regime that emerged in the mid-1990s and 
survived into the new century. Different building blocks representing creditor 
groups could be assembled based on an IMF-supported program design. The 
precise mix of blocks would depend on the sovereign’s debt composition, and 
its political and financial constraints. For example, the hypothetical debtor in 
Figure 1 avoids London Club, domestic, and multilateral debt restructuring 
either because it has no debt in these categories, or because restructuring it is 
judged undesirable. These blocks, greyed out in Figure 1, might be 




Reform, J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2001) (describing an authority gap in sovereign debt), Patrick Bolton & 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be 
Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004) (on the consequences of having no system of priorities in 
sovereign debt). 
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Figure 1: A Modular Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime circa 2000 
   
 
C. Repeat Players and Routines  
The old sovereign restructuring regime depicted in Figure 1 might have 
been informal, but it was far from chaotic. It delivered a measure of relief for 
debtors and impressive returns for creditors with no treaty, no statute, and no 
court in charge.44 It was flexible enough to adapt to massive shifts in global 
 
 44. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief 
(Univ. of Munich, Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2014-49, 2014), https://epub.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/21832/1/Distant_Mirror_October_27_2014.pdf; Carmen Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 
Sovereign Debt Relief and its Aftermath, 14 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 215 (2016) (debt relief figures); 
Michael Tomz & Mark Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default, 2013 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 247; Christoph Klingen et al., How Private Creditors Fared in Emerging Debt Markets, 1970-
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politics and economics. It was also effective enough, and accepted generally 
enough—just enough—to preempt far-reaching alternatives that periodically 
sprouted up at the United Nations, at the IMF, and among civil society 
groups.45 
Nonetheless, it is hard to explain the regime’s durability by its outcomes 
alone. Restructurings came late, and often took a long time to complete.46 They 
delivered short-term liquidity relief, but often did not address the underlying 
solvency problems.47 Re-defaults followed within a few years of sovereign 
debt restructurings in nearly forty percent of the cases.48 While causation is 
open to debate, some mix of ill-conceived and ill-timed relief, and bad policy, 
likely played a part. 
The dominance of repeat players and institutions shaped by long-term 
political alliances may help make sense of the regime survival puzzle. Late 
twentieth century sovereign debt restructurings involved a relatively small and 
tight cohort of officials from a handful of countries and international 
organizations, a dozen or so big financial firms, and half a dozen law firms.49 
They had developed the practices described earlier through trial and error, 
reacting to crises. They were also invested in these practices and controlled the 
institutions charged with their operation. Knowing the composition of and 
relationships among the restructuring modules, the customary sequence of 
negotiations, the range of terms Paris Club creditors had accepted as 
“comparable,” the habitual exclusion of certain informally “preferred” claims 
from burden-sharing50 was (and still is) invaluable in a world without statutory 
bankruptcy. Such knowledge can confer status, gain a seat at the negotiating 
table, and even help fashion arguments for reform. Long-term investment in the 
regime and a measure of social cohesion among those “in the know” helped 
sustain it.51 
 
2000, at 37 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/13, 2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004 
/wp0413.pdf (observing “sizable ex post premiums” for creditors of emerging market countries in the 
1990s). 
 45. See, e.g., Sgard, supra note 10; RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 132-48 (describing the North-
South Dialogue and the defeat of the International Debt Commission proposal in the 1970s); Hagan, 
supra note 10 (describing the rise and fall of the IMF’s proposal for the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM)); see also infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing SDRM). 
 46. See, e.g., supra note 2 (multiple sources citing evidence of the “too little-too late” problem 
in sovereign debt restructuring). 
 47. See, e.g., IMF Lending Framework Annexes, infra note 154. 
 48. Duggar, supra note 2; see also Martin Guzman & Joseph Stiglitz, Toward a Framework 
for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute?, in TOO LITTLE, 
TOO LATE. THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 241 (Martin Guzman, José Antonio 
Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz eds. 2016). 
 49. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 24, at 59-61; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1634-36 
(2006). 
 50. Exclusion from comparability and other burden-sharing mechanisms was tantamount to a 
grant of seniority (“preferred creditor status”) for claims of identical legal rank. Short-term trade credits, 
interbank loans, and, until recently, multilateral debt, have enjoyed such informal preference—
presumably based on other participants’ collective judgment that it was in their interest to consent to 
informal subordination. See RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, Ranking of Obligations, in THE FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 479 (2015). 
 51. Compare this depiction and Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of 
International Financial Regulation, 88 Ind. L. Rev. 1405 (2013) (arguing that soft law and informal 
network governance in international financial regulation has empowered certain political actors to the 
detriment of financial stability). 
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On the other hand, the modules, the web of cross-conditionality, and the 
many negotiating practices—let alone the logic behind them—were 
unintelligible to ordinary people, the ultimate debtors and creditors. Public debt 
appeared as a matter for private ordering, both in the legal sense (contract) and 
in the practical sense (behind closed doors). The regime as a whole could 
hardly claim to be effective, fair, or legitimate in absolute terms, if only 
because so few saw it as a regime, and because there was no shared standard by 
which to judge it.52 It might have delivered serviceable outcomes on occasion, 
but it was not worth fighting for. 
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING CIRCA 2010 
Three trends undermined the modular sovereign debt restructuring regime 
described in Part I. First, new creditors grew in importance. Countries such as 
China and Russia, as well as distressed bond funds and sovereign wealth 
funds,53 among others, were not necessarily invested in the old restructuring 
processes and institutions. Second, cross-border capital mobility and 
government creditors’ participation in the private capital markets eroded the 
boundaries of the restructuring modules, undermining internal discipline and 
cross-conditionality. Third, individual creditor lawsuits filled the enforcement 
gap left by the weakening modules. Some of these trends were already under 
way in the mid-1990s, but they intensified and combined to alter the landscape 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
A. New Players  
In the 1980s, G-7 finance officials and the world’s biggest commercial 
bankers, many of whom were on first-name basis, comprised the bulk of 
foreign creditors in sovereign debt restructurings.54 By the early 2000s, new 
private and public players took center stage. Investment funds, pension funds, 
and hedge funds took over from banks as borrowers switched from loans to 
bonds in the 1990s. In the 2000s, governments that had been on the periphery 
of global finance ran large trade surpluses and expanded bilateral lending, 
while the G-7 wound theirs down. Sovereign wealth funds from surplus 
 
 52. Legitimacy here does not look solely or primarily to the authority of the parties or the 
restructuring forum, but rather to the terms of the debt and the restructuring process that produce it. See 
Marie Sudreau & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Sovereign Debt Governance, Legitimacy, and the 
Sustainable Development Goals: Examining the Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, 24 WASH. INT’L L.J. 613 (2015); cf. the discussion of legitimacy above and in the text to 
ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN 
FINANCE (2014) (considering the function of sovereignty in sovereign debt). 
 53. “Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are special purpose investment funds or arrangements, 
owned by the general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, 
SWFs hold, manage or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and … [invest] in foreign 
financial assets.” International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF), Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices—Santiago Principles, at 3 (Oct. 2008) http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs 
/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf. 
 54. KRAFT, supra note 16 (describing coordination among bilateral and multilateral officials 
and money center banks in the Mexican crisis of 1982); see also PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: 
INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 175-205 
(2003) (describing G-7 governments’ engagement with their financial institutions to roll over interbank 
loans to Korea in late 1997). 
2016] Sovereign Debt: Now What? 59 
  
countries invested in a growing range of international assets, including 
sovereign debt. Meanwhile, the G-20—a group that included both wealthy and 
middle-income countries—was taking over global economic and regulatory 
coordination from the G-7.55 
The rise of sovereign bonds in the hands of atomistic creditors, 
presumptively unconnected to finance officials and uninterested in the public 
good, has drawn the bulk of critical attention in sovereign debt literature and 
policy since the mid-1990s.56 When foreign bonds were a small part of the 
debt stock—as late as Russia’s 1998 crisis—they could be paid in full without 
putting overall program financing or other creditors’ participation at risk.57 
However, “bond exceptionalism” did not last: within two years of Russia’s 
crisis, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Ukraine each launched a distressed bond 
exchange.58  
The advent of tradable bonds has had a mixed impact on crisis resolution 
overall. Despite predictions of mass holdouts, bonds took less time to 
restructure than loans thanks to a mix of creditor incentives and transactional 
techniques. 59  Unlike banks, mark-to-market investors could not carry 
distressed debt on their balance sheets at face value, and did not benefit from 
delay as such.60 They had every incentive to buy bonds for fifteen cents on the 
dollar and quickly settle for thirty cents, pocketing a 100 percent return on 
investment while delivering 70 percent principal reduction to the debtor. On the 
other hand, funds specializing in distressed sovereign debt collection also grew 
along with bond finance. Although they were a minority of sovereign bond 
holders, these funds sued much more often.61 
New official bilateral lenders have received much less attention in the 
 
 55. The G-20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, and European Union. The grouping originated in the policy coordination 
efforts after the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1997-1999, but did not assume its leadership role until 
2008. See, e.g., China’s G-20 website, http://www.g20.org/English/Dynamic/201606/t20160601_2291 
.html. China hosts the G-20 in the 2016 cycle. 
 56. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, International Financial 
Architecture for 2002: New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Speech at the National 
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner (Nov 26, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.imf.org 
/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm). 
 57. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 3, at 104. Russia spared only a 
subset of its foreign bonds, those issued after the fall of the Soviet Union. By exempting post-Soviet 
Eurobonds from restructuring, it sought to signal both that the current government would pay its debts 
and that bonds were a privileged instrument. Russia’s attempt to distinguish between Soviet and post-
Soviet-era debt was a reputational gambit. Cf. LIENAU, supra note 52 (regime change implies new 
sovereignty). 
 58. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 3 (case studies of early bond restructurings); 
see also Michael Peterson, Emerging Market Bonds: A Crash Course in Default, EUROMONEY, Oct. 
1999, at 47-50 (describing some of the features that made bonds hard to modify, and led to their 
exclusion from restructurings). 
 59. Bi et al., supra note 21 (theoretical model for lack of coordination problems); Duggar, 
supra note 2, at 33 (citing 10 months on average between a government’s bond restructuring 
announcement and completion, compared to loan restructurings that typically took years to negotiate). 
 60. Supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
 61. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court 
10-11 (Working Paper, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997 (showing 
that lawsuits abroad accompanied only five percent of sovereign defaults in the 1980s, compared to fifty 
percent in the 2000s, and attributing the spike in lawsuits to the growth of specialized funds). 
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academic and policy debates, although they quickly became very important in 
some countries. In the 2000s, manufacturing and commodity exporters with 
large stores of government savings, most notably China and the Gulf states, 
began investing more of their foreign currency reserves in the emerging 
markets.62 This trend accelerated after 2009, when interest rates dropped near 
zero in Europe and the United States post-crisis, and sent investors looking for 
higher returns elsewhere.63 In parallel, China expanded its official bilateral 
lending to poor and middle income governments so dramatically that it eclipsed 
the original Paris Club lenders in some countries within a few years.64 
New creditors contributed to the rise in complex forms of government-to-
government lending that did not quite fit Paris Club reporting conventions. For 
example, Venezuela began borrowing from China against future oil sales in 
2007; by 2015, oil payment advances from China reportedly were among the 
scant few sources of external financing it had left. By mid-2016, Venezuela 
sought a debt restructuring by another name as more and more of its oil exports 
effectively functioned as debt repayments.65 Angola was even worse off, with 
no spare export capacity left after making its debt payments in oil.66 
Lending that combined features of trade, investment, development aid, 
and strategic alliance-building was not new, but the scale and the players 
were.67 In the past, such complex, mixed-motive arrangements might have 
 
 62. See IMF, Market Developments and Issues, Global Financial Stability Report 99 (April 
2006), [hereinafter IMF GFSR April 2006]; see, e.g., Portfolio Overview, ABU DHABI INV. AUTHORITY 
(ADIA), www.adia.ae/En/Investment/Portfolio.aspx (specifies 10-20% for government bonds and 15-
25% for emerging markets). ADIA’s total assets under management were estimated at $773 billion. 
Andrew Torchia, Abu Dhabi fund ADIA Manages More of its Billions In-House, REUTERS (June 2, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-sovereign-funds-idUSL5N0YN3LC20150602. 
 63. Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market 
Sovereign Debt (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/14/39, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp 
/2014/wp1439.pdf. 
 64. For example, China became Angola’s largest creditor by 2014, holding 41% of its debt, 
followed by the United Kingdom with 27%. IMF, Angola Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV 
Consultation, Country Report No. 14/274, at 9 (Aug. 14, 2014) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr 
/2014/cr14274.pdf. Some of China’s exposure is secured by oil. Yun Sun, China’s Aid to Africa: 
Monster or Messiah?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02 
/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun. China’s lending to Congo has grown rapidly since 2006, much of it 
effectively secured by oil proceeds that Congo is required to keep on deposit in China. China became the 
dominant creditor after Congo secured HIPC and MDRI relief from wealthy countries and multilateral 
institutions. IMF, Republic of Congo Staff Report For the 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report 
No. 14/272, at 9 (July 7, 2014) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14272 
.pdf; see also IMF, Republic of Congo Staff Report for The 2014 Article IV Consultation—Debt 
Sustainability Analysis, Country Report No. 14/272, at 2 (July 7, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external 
/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14272.pdf (China accounted for 63% of Congo’s official bilateral debt and 15% of 
its overall external debt in 2010). 
 65. Corina Pons, Alexandra Ulmer & Marianna Parraga, Venezuela in Talks with China for 
Grace Period in Oil-for-Loans Deal, REUTERS (Jun. 15, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-venezuela-china-idUSKCN0Z01VH. 
 66. Libby George, Growing Chinese Debt Leaves Angola with Little Spare Oil, REUTERS 
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/angola-oil-finance-idUSL5N16H3EV. 
 67. The phenomenon of deliberately ambiguous financing forms is not new. For example, the 
United States financed South Vietnam’s military with disguised agricultural credits during the Vietnam 
War. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for Sales of Agricultural Commodities, 22 U.S.T. 1459, Sec. 
II.A.2 (June 28, 1971); Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L. L. 697, 705–06 (1997). Vietnam refused to repay the credits when it 
came to the Paris Club to restructure its debt in 1993. The difference is that the new creditors are not 
fully part of the institutions within which creditors negotiated how to deal with these ambiguities. For 
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been settled quietly on the margins of Paris Club negotiations. Classifying the 
debt and finding a forum to renegotiate it is more of a challenge when both 
debtors and creditors view the prevailing regime with suspicion, and are grossly 
underrepresented in its institutions.68 
B. No More Modules?  
After governments relaxed restrictions on cross-border capital flows, 
domestic and foreign investors gained access to debt instruments that had been 
beyond their reach.69 Foreign creditors could buy local currency and local-law 
bonds in the domestic markets of poor and middle income countries. 70 
Domestic banks and pension funds could participate in foreign bond offerings 
side by side with foreign investors. 71  Government creditors could take 
advantage of bigger, deeper, more liquid international markets to sell their 
bilateral loans.72 As bond investors, central banks, reserve managers, and 
sovereign wealth funds were not uniformly risk-averse; some made bets on the 
bonds of troubled countries and actively managed their sovereign debt 
portfolios.73 Active trading moreover meant that the mix of creditors behind a 
debt stock could change at any time, so that not even the debtor could ever 
know for sure who held what debt.74 
 
example, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq claimed that much of its “debt” to its Gulf neighbors was 
supposed to have been a grant, to help support Iraq in its war against Iran. Negotiations with Gulf 
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(observing that China and Gulf states are underrepresented in the multilateral organizations, including 
the IMF and the World Bank). 
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Globalization and Economic Policies, Chapter 5 in DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, Handbooks in 
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its export credit loans to the Russian government). 
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The trends just described were fundamentally inconsistent with a modular 
regime based on similar creditors holding similar legal claims. The advent of 
bonds already raised questions about the modules’ viability—bondholders were 
a diverse and dynamic lot—but debtors and their advisers seized coordination 
initiative in the late 1990s in a way that initially made bond exchanges look like 
just another module. 75  They conducted informal “soundings” of key 
bondholders before making exchange offers, and used contract modification 
procedures to make holding out unattractive.76 However, as the 2000s wore on, 
it was no longer safe to assume that the building blocks depicted in Figure 1 
represented creditors with common interests and constraints, common 
accounting conventions, and more-or-less identical contracts. By 2010, a single 
bond exchange potentially had to sweep in Latin American pension funds, U.K. 
banks, euro area insurers, Asian governments, Italian pensioners, and Cayman 
Island hedge funds managed from Connecticut, holding bonds denominated in 
half a dozen currencies and governed by the laws of as many jurisdictions. 
Some creditors might have been susceptible to informal regulatory pressure, 
others driven by geopolitical imperatives, yet others committed to litigate for 
full repayment. 77  Reputational considerations and intra-group discipline 
weakened. 
Changes in the composition and direction of international capital flows 
made some modules irrelevant, disrupted sequencing, and undermined cross-
conditionality. London Club bankers’ committees atrophied as syndicated loans 
shrank. Bondholder committees failed to take over as the default coordination 
mechanism, although they played important roles in some crises.78  Bond 
exchanges now sometimes preceded Paris Club agreements, but cross-
conditionality failed to adapt. 79  Official lenders rebuffed debtor and 
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bondholder demands for “reverse comparability,” apparently convinced that the 
point of comparability was to protect their taxpayers, not to let the first mover 
shape the overall debt restructuring terms.80 
However, The Paris Club’s ability to dictate terms was eroding. The trend 
that began with granting countries present value debt relief in the late 1980s 
and debt stock reduction in the mid-1990s, culminated in agreements to write 
off the debts of the poorest countries at the turn of the century.81 By 2010, the 
club looked too small to influence other creditors, public or private. Its 
members had delivered near-total debt relief for some countries, such as Iraq 
and the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and got full repayment from 
others, such as Russia. The G-7 now favored grants over loans in development 
aid.82 China and the Gulf states seemed to be in no hurry to join.83 
C. Gaps and Gap-filling  
Disappearing modules and weakening cross-conditionality left gaps in the 
debt restructuring architecture. As described in Part I of this essay, the old 
regime tried to compensate for weak enforcement and the absence of 
bankruptcy discharge, and secured just barely enough relief for the debtor and 
burden-sharing among creditors to keep going. Its continued ability to deliver 
was now in serious doubt. 
The IMF’s role at the heart of the restructuring regime came to look 
awkward in the 2000s. In response to the rise of bonded debt, IMF management 
proposed a treaty-based sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), just 
as Argentina careened to the largest foreign bond default on record in late 
2001.84 Despite support from European governments among others, SDRM 
suffered a humiliating defeat in 2003, blocked by the United States and large 
emerging markets, including Mexico and Brazil.85 The intervening debate was 
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often bitter, with some members, private creditors and civil society groups 
accusing the IMF of engaging in a power grab.86 After the SDRM trauma, IMF 
staff and Executive Board members were inclined to tread gingerly in the 
sovereign debt space. Besides, the urgency had passed—not many mainstream 
policy makers could justify obsessing about debt restructuring institutions in 
the mid-2000s, when memories of financial crises grew faint, and the fund’s 
coffers grew flush from countries repaying their debts.87 
Apart from such political sensitivities, the IMF’s ability to anchor still-
hypothetical crisis response88 suffered from the growing gap between its 
resources and the scale of global capital flows, reflecting potential balance of 
payments vulnerabilities. Figure 2 shows IMF lending capacity against the 
background of capital flows in and out of the euro area and developing 
countries between 1999 and 2006. At the end of 1999, with much of Asia, 
Brazil, and Russia still in crisis, the IMF could lend up to $86 billion of its own 
resources, and borrow an additional $47 billion from wealthy member 
governments.89 Even after disbursing nearly $10 billion to Brazil, $5.6 billion 
to Russia, and $6.3 billion to Indonesia during its 1998-1999 financial year,90 
the IMF could backstop a respectable 35 percent of gross capital outflows from 
the developing world. By 2006, with large emerging market economies 
borrowing from the capital markets and repaying the IMF, it could lend up to 
$189 billion of its own resources—but that was only eleven percent of the 
$1,723.8 billion in outflows from the developing world.91 Including $1,941.4 
billion from the euro area in 2006 would put available IMF resources at five 
percent of the relevant capital outflows. Then again, no one had imagined in 
2006 that the IMF would be disbursing $20.6 billion to Greece and $8.1 billion 
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to Ireland in just four years.92 
 
Figure 2: 
Total Capital Inflows and Outflows, IMF Lending Capacity 




Source: IMF 93 
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 92. IMF, Financial Operations and Transactions, Annual Report 2011 App. Table II.4 (2011), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2011/eng/pdf/a2.pdf. U.S. dollar amounts are based on 
SDR1=USD1.62. 
 93. IMF GFSR October 2007, supra note 91; IMF’s Financial Resources and Liquidity 
Position, 1997-December 1999, supra note 89; IMF’s Financial Resources and Liquidity Position, 2004 
– December 2006, supra note 91. Figures for IMF lending capacity exclude available borrowing 
arrangements, which stood at $47 billion in December 1999, and $51 billion in December 2006. Id. See 
also, One-Year Forward Commitment Capacity, supra note 87; MARKUS JAEGER, DEUTSCHE BANK 
RESEARCH, DOES THE IMF HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO BAIL OUT THE EMERGING MARKETS? 
(2008) (market view of IMF capacity in light of the “explosion” in net private capital flows and potential 
future exposure). 





     To the extent the IMF’s power to set restructuring parameters and nudge 
the process along depended on its unique ability to mobilize enough financing 
quickly to stop a run, stem contagion, and keep the distressed economy afloat 
during the workout, this power looked likely to diminish—for better or worse.94 
The IMF’s lopsided governance made matters worse. It reflected 
twentieth century compromises, with the G-7 and small European countries 
substantially overrepresented compared to the big emerging markets, whose 
voice and vote did not reflect the size and international importance of their 
economies.95 Yet the incumbents showed few signs of either giving up control 
or investing in the IMF in the early and mid-2000s. As finance got bigger, 
powerful stakeholders spoke of the need to constrain the IMF as a source of 
“bailouts” and moral hazard.96 Meanwhile, post-crisis countries, particularly in 
Asia, accumulated vast foreign exchange reserves and put in place regional 
arrangements that would allow them to bypass the IMF should misfortune 
strike again.97 
Despite its outdated vote allocation, shrinking scale, self-insuring clients, 
and contested track record, the IMF remained indispensable in a debt crisis. It 
had the unique combination of institutional memory and analytical capacity, a 
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record of past practice, a global membership, and a formal governance structure 
prescribed by treaty—which made its actions at least somewhat accessible and 
predictable. The IMF’s role as distressed countries’ gateway to external 
financing long made it a valuable lever for other actors; it rose in importance as 
the modular regime faded and other levers disappeared. Public and private 
creditors sought to use IMF lending and arrears policies to gain leverage in 
restructuring negotiations. Sovereign borrowers cited IMF analysis and policy 
conditions to bolster their position vis-à-vis foreign and domestic constituents.98 
As it was called upon to fill more coordination gaps, the IMF was at risk of 
becoming both under-funded and overtaxed. 
Foreign courts became another important gap-filler in the declining 
regime. Lawsuits accompanied only five percent of all restructurings in the 
1980s, but this number climbed to 50 percent in the 2000s, with the poorest 
countries disproportionately represented among the defendants.99 Sovereign 
debt literature generally attributes the rise of litigation since the 1990s to the 
rise of tradable bonds and unregulated investors in sovereign debt markets. 
However, bonds were but one element in the endemic weakening of the 
modular architecture. 
The challenge by 2010 was not (or not just) the odd bondholder ready to 
go to court to bully countries into full repayment while they struggled to feed 
their people and pay cooperative creditors pennies on the dollar. Hardball 
negotiating tactics, free-riding, and litigious investors were part of the 
sovereign debt landscape in the bank loan days, when much of the law 
governing sovereign debt was made.100 As the rest of the landscape changed, 
coordination became harder, and the courts assumed a more prominent role. 
National courts sitting in contract cases are ill-suited to the coordination 
task. Unlike bankruptcy courts, they do not preside over a comprehensive, 
collective proceeding. They decide one-off disputes that happen to be brought 
before them, and have limited means and limited incentives to consider the 
sovereign’s debt comprehensively. Having rejected substantive defenses to 
sovereign default in the 1990s, the courts left themselves no room to award 
creditors less than contract principal and past-due interest.101 On the other 
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hand, they had no new way to force sovereigns to pay. They could make a 
government’s life difficult and pressure it to settle, but they still had no 
property to seize or culprit to jail. 
Policy makers, judges, and academics looked to another gap-filler—
standardized contract reform—to help overcome emerging coordination gaps. 
“Collective Action Clauses” (CACs) in sovereign bonds allow a supermajority 
of creditors to approve restructuring terms and bind the dissenters. CACs had 
been the norm in the London market since the nineteenth century, but faced 
resistance in New York, where drafting custom required unanimous consent to 
amend financial terms. In 2002-2003, CACs became the most prominent 
market-friendly alternative to SDRM, and a subject of dogged advocacy by 
U.S. officials.102 After Mexico issued a bond with CACs in February of 2003, 
New York custom shifted away from unanimity.103 
The practical operation of CACs seemed secondary next to the goal of 
defeating SDRM.104 Lost in the successful drive for contract change was the 
fact that CACs were simultaneously good at boosting creditor participation in 
an exchange offer, and bad at blocking committed free-riders. Since CACs had 
traditionally operated within individual bond issues, creditors who bought a 
blocking minority in a single small issue could reject the restructuring offer, see 
the rest of the debt stock swept into the restructuring, and then sue for 
preferential settlement.105 This strategy works best if the free-rider is small: if 
everyone holds out, there is no restructuring and no side payment. 106 
Perversely, CACs’ transparent voting thresholds help the free-rider identify 
acquisition targets and clear the field of competitors. 
Weaker discipline among creditors was not all bad for the debtors, even if 
it threatened to prolong the restructuring process. Without modules and cross-
conditionality, sovereigns could play creditors off against one another. If 
private foreign investors would not lend or restructure, a government might 
turn to an oil-rich neighbor; if IMF conditions seemed too onerous, it could try 
borrowing from domestic banks, or from China; if Paris Club relief were slow 
in coming, foreign bondholders might be persuaded to move first.107 
The upshot of these developments was a restructuring regime with limited 
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sway over debtors or creditors. The London Club was history; the Paris Club at 
risk of becoming a side-show. The IMF was “just one creditor” among many—
and far from the biggest—anchoring a regime where other creditors could not 
be counted upon to cooperate.108 National courts presided over isolated claims 
with no mandate to consider the overall debt picture, and had no way to compel 
the sovereign to follow their orders. Such a regime might be able to nudge 
willing parties to compromise, but was not fit to host mortal combat to come. 
III. SHOCKS IN 2010-2015 
A series of shocks between 2010 and 2015 in Argentina, Greece, and 
Ukraine publicly exposed major flaws in the modular debt restructuring regime. 
U.S. federal court injunctions that blocked Argentina’s access to international 
payment systems led to wildly unequal recoveries for similarly situated 
creditors, rewarding the most aggressive litigation strategies.109 In Greece, the 
IMF repeatedly failed to shape debt restructuring outcomes, tainting public 
perceptions of its analysis and lending decisions. Greece also demonstrated the 
toxic politics of government-to-government debt—reviving ugly stereotypes 
and stoking historical resentments that threatened political compromises 
underpinning Europe’s monetary union. 110  Both Argentina and Greece 
confirmed the weakness of then-standard bond contract terms against holdouts. 
Ukraine’s debt to Russia, tangled up in the military conflict between them, 
showed how remnants of the old modular regime could be gamed by free-
riders, prominently including official creditors.111 The exposition below is 
brief, as I have written about these crises elsewhere.112 I focus on their present 
implications for the sovereign debt restructuring regime. 
A. Argentina  
Argentina’s crisis challenged the regime from the start. After the 
government defaulted on $82 billion in foreign bonds on December 24, 2001, it 
took three years to propose restructuring terms to its private bondholders—with 
no IMF program or Paris Club restructuring in sight.113 The offer, initially 
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valued at approximately thirty cents on the dollar, swept in more than ninety-
two percent of the defaulted debt in two bond exchanges, in 2005 and 2010.114 
Creditors who refused to go along sued in national courts around the world, and 
instituted arbitration proceedings before the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).115 For over a decade, successive 
governments refused to settle with holdouts on preferential terms, and paid 
them nothing. 
Beginning in 2012, the U.S. federal judge presiding over multiple 
lawsuits brought against Argentina in New York blocked the government from 
servicing its restructured debt until it paid the holdouts in full.116 Trial and 
appellate court opinions cited bond contract terms and the government’s 
“uniquely recalcitrant” behavior to justify the equitable remedy.117 Judges 
interpreted the pari passu (equal step) clause in Argentina’s old defaulted 
bonds as a promise to pay all foreign debt in proportion to the current contract 
claim.118 Argentina’s steadfast refusal to pay the old bonds or honor court 
judgments, and the domestic measures it took to block holdouts from 
collecting, amounted to a breach, according to the courts. Ordering the 
government to pay money damages was useless under the circumstances, 
leaving injunctions as the only option in the judges’ eyes. Enjoined, Argentina 
could no longer make interest payments to creditors who had forgiven two-
thirds of their original claims in 2005 and 2010, until it paid full principal and 
past-due interest to creditors who had forgiven none.119 
The injunctions operated entirely by targeting third parties who, unlike 
the immune sovereign, had a lot to lose in a fight with a U.S. federal court.120 
Trustees, paying agents, and clearing and payment systems around the world 
were mentioned by name, and risked sanctions if they tried to pass Argentina’s 
funds to the holders of restructured bonds. When the government did try to pay 
in the summer of 2014, the money was frozen at the Bank of New York Mellon 
as trustee for the bondholders,121 adding another $29 billion in principal to the 
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affirmed as clarified in NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 237-39 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 241; NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). 
 119. Id. By giving up their defaulted bonds, the restructured bond holders had given up their 
right to accelerated principal repayment and penalty interest on the old bonds. Only periodic interest 
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 120. Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 112. 
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heap of Argentina’s unpaid debt.122 U.S. courts even blocked Argentina from 
issuing new local-law bonds in Buenos Aires, where Citibank’s branch served 
as custodian, on the theory that such bonds would be sold to foreigners and 
constitute foreign debt covered by the “equal treatment” obligation.123 The net 
effect was a court-imposed global financial boycott of the government. 
The government of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner reacted to 
the boycott by digging in.124 Officials continued to cast invective at the U.S. 
judge, placing him at the center of the country’s domestic politics even after the 
appeals courts upheld his rulings,125 after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to 
review the case,126 and after Argentina was held in contempt. Meanwhile, 
holdout creditors fed U.S. judges a steady diet of juicy press clippings from 
Argentina, so that insults issued for domestic consumption in Buenos Aires 
might as well have been uttered in their Manhattan courtrooms.127  
The conflict did not necessarily extend to the rest of the U.S. government: 
at the height of the court battle in 2014, Argentina quietly agreed to repay the 
Paris Club, including the United States, $9.7 billion over five years, with no 
links either to an IMF program, or to the treatment of private creditors. It was 
able to avoid the web of cross-conditionality by promising to pay in full.128 
The Paris Club deal was entirely beyond the purview of the contract litigation, 
where, fourteen years after the initial default, any trust that might have existed 
between the sovereign debtor and the U.S. courts was long gone. The conflict 
had become personal, political, and ugly. 
Elections in the fall of 2015 brought a new government, which made 
settling the case and returning to the global financial markets a top priority.129 
The quick settlement brought a bizarre distribution of gains and losses, 
especially when considered in light of the courts’ professed commitment to 
inter-creditor equity.130 Argentina paid $9.3 billion in cash to settle the case, 
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including $4.7 billion to four investment firms that had pursued it in courts 
around the world.131  These were some of the most dogged and creative 
holdouts, the first to obtain the pari passu injunctions. Some of their contracts 
paid more than 100 percent annual interest, and ultimately returned more than 
900 percent on principal in the litigation settlement, which also included 
reimbursement of their legal expenses.132 Other creditors who obtained court 
judgments got a fifty percent return on principal.133 By comparison, creditors 
who participated in the restructurings and had their bond payments frozen for 
nearly two years netted a relatively modest twenty to twenty-five percent return 
on principal, according to market estimates. 134  Creditors who neither 
exchanged their bonds, nor sued before the statute of limitations had run in 
New York got nothing at all.135 Argentina paid the holdout claims and its 
restructured bond arrears from the proceeds of an oversubscribed $16.5 billion 
bond offering, completed on April 19, 2016.136 
The closing chapters of Argentina’s debt saga cast doubt on the ability of 
the prevailing restructuring regime to achieve anything close to a prompt, 
durable, or equitable outcome for anyone involved. After a decade of disruptive 
but feckless enforcement attempts (including temporary seizure of a tall 
ship137), national courts commandeered global payment intermediaries for the 
private benefit of a small minority of creditors. Bystanders were harmed to 
boost returns for the free-riders. Cross-conditionality, which had been used to 
promote burden-sharing among restructuring modules in the 1980s and 1990s, 
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had mutated into “equal treatment” injunctions in the hands of a national court, 
which produced fabulously unequal distribution. Judges got drawn into a dirty 
fight between a sovereign they could not control and a few sophisticated, well-
resourced creditors, who took advantage of the common-law courts’ narrow 
purview—in stark contrast to bankruptcy’s comprehensive, collective process. 
In the end, it was domestic elections, not foreign courts, that made settlement 
possible. 
The deal might have been good enough for Argentina, which had been 
hemorrhaging foreign exchange reserves, but it was not good not for the 
sovereign debt restructuring regime. As the fog clears, there is no consensus on 
what constitutes inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt. Argentina leaves 
behind a confused and contested jurisprudence, which will take years to sort 
out. On the other hand, the transactional precedent is clear: debt settlements 
favor the most aggressive litigants, incomplete restructurings can be hijacked 
by holdouts, and not suing is the one sure path for a creditor to be left out in the 
cold. 
B. Greece  
The Greek crisis that began in late 2009 tested multiple elements of the 
old modular regime, including the IMF’s ability to establish overall parameters 
of reform and relief, its relationship with other official creditors, and the 
viability of existing contract tools for creditor coordination. The results were 
discouraging. 
The IMF, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) launched a €110 billion ($145 billion) financing program for Greece on 
May 9, 2010. The IMF’s contribution of €30 billion ($40 billion) to this 
“troika” package was by far the largest program in its history.138 The program 
went ahead despite IMF staff concerns about public debt sustainability, and 
based on heroic assumptions about tax collection, privatization, unemployment, 
economic growth, and a speedy return to the capital markets.139 Figure 4, 
drawn from the IMF’s own ex-post evaluation of the program, illustrates. 
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Figure 4: 
Evolution of IMF Program Projections for Greek GDP and Unemployment140 




Early baseline projections had the debt ratio rising from 115 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in May 2010 above 150 percent in 2013, 
potentially reaching 220 percent in some stress scenarios.141 These projections 
meant that Greek debt could not be sustainable with “high probability” in the 
medium term, which posed a problem under the IMF’s policy barring large-
scale lending to over-indebted countries. As the staff saw it, the IMF had two 
choices: condition its participation in the troika on Greek debt relief, or ask its 
Executive Board to approve a policy change. Less than two years after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers had brought global finance to the brink, fear of 
Greece turning into “another Lehman-type event” took debt restructuring off 
the table.142 
The Lehman reference underscores the challenge of managing debt crises 
in large economies integrated in regional and global financial systems (the euro 
area is an extreme example). Neither the IMF nor the European Union was 
prepared to address contagion in 2010 with liquidity support for its likely 
victims. Although IMF members had agreed in 2009 to lend the Fund up to 
$576 billion,143 its resources remained visibly inadequate to rescue large euro 
area economies, certainly not two or three at the same time. The IMF’s lending 
capacity in April 2010, on the eve of its first Greek program, was $255.5 
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billion, counting supplemental borrowing of $253 billion.144 In the next twelve 
months, it would approve nearly $210 billion in new commitments, including 
large, front-loaded programs for Greece and Ireland.145 Spain and Italy, which 
looked shaky, were in a different category altogether. At the end of 2009, Spain 
had $815 billion in sovereign debt and Italy had $2.5 trillion, compared to 
Greece’s $431 billion. In less than two years, foreign banks reduced their 





Sources: Eurostat, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, IMF147 
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If the crisis in Greece spread to Italy, contagion across the euro area, to 
the United Kingdom and the United States could bring back the darkest days of 
September 2008.148 The euro area might have addressed the problem on its 
own—it had a powerful central bank, and strong economies at the core—but it 
was only beginning to develop the political consensus, legal and institutional 
tools against contagion.149 When the risk of contagion topped the policy 
agenda, it was down to the IMF, which had crisis-fighting experience and 
resources on standby. In 2010, these resources were not enough to support new 
and potential IMF clients, which were vastly bigger than the old ones.  
With no backstop in sight for large economies vulnerable to contagion 
from Greece, the IMF changed its lending policy. From May 2010, countries 
whose debts were not sustainable with high probability could avoid 
restructuring and still get large-scale IMF support, provided there was a high 
risk of “systemic international spillovers.”150 Greece then proceeded to borrow 
at least in part for the sake of broader financial stability—although Greece 
alone would be bound to repay.151 
The IMF’s failure to insist on debt relief for Greece in 2010 was not in 
itself a challenge to the old sovereign debt restructuring regime; it was the 
IMF’s persistent inability well into 2011 to force a restructuring once it became 
convinced that one was necessary, and despite the risk to its own resources.152 
Finance officials had always been wary of debtor moral hazard, hurting banks, 
spending tax money, and, more recently, undermining the “catalytic” effect of 
IMF lending on the debtor’s access to the private capital markets.153 The 
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modular building in Figure 1 did not require debt reduction per se, only some 
combination of new money, debt restructuring, and adjustment to fill the 
financing gap during the program period. Countries avoided restructuring in 21 
out of 53 emerging market sovereign debt distress episodes identified by the 
IMF between 1980 and 2012.154 Debt stock sustainability became a formal 
condition for very large (“exceptional access”) IMF programs in 2002, as part 
of a campaign to limit bailouts and moral hazard.155 
There is no evidence that the 2002 policy made large programs any more 
exceptional, nor that it made debt restructuring more common. However, for as 
long as the IMF remained a source of some and the gatekeeper for most 
external financing in crisis, the 2002 reform raised the stakes for IMF staff 
analysis of borrowers’ debt sustainability. At least in theory, large-scale IMF 
programs would mean debt restructuring, unless that analysis showed sovereign 
debt to be sustainable “with high probability.”156 Private creditors became big 
consumers of the analysis, and tough critics of the methodology. 
The IMF’s capacity to leverage its analytical and financial resources to 
shape a country’s recovery program had anchored the old modular restructuring 
regime.157 Greece exposed the limits of this capacity. IMF staff called for debt 
relief early in 2011; a bond restructuring came a year later, after more than 
$150 billion in private capital had fled the country and was replaced by public 
funds from the euro area and the IMF.158 A new IMF program in March 2012 
brought more loans and projections that Greek debt would fall below 120 
percent of GDP by 2020—even as domestic politics deteriorated and support 
for the program sank.159 In July 2015, the debt stock neared 180 percent of 
GDP and the Greek banking system was on life support from the ECB, 
rationing cash withdrawals. A new government was in a standoff with the 
troika over a third IMF program, and the IMF was at odds with its troika 
partners over government-to-government debt relief. In the middle of an acute 
political crisis, Greece threatened to abandon the euro and delayed repayment 
of €1.55 billion ($1.73 billion) to the IMF . . . causing new anxiety for being 
“the first developed country to default” on the multilateral lender.160  
In May of 2016, Greek debt-to-GDP ratio malingered at 180 percent. 
Euro area governments agreed to disburse €10.3 billion ($11.5 billion) in new 
loans, but the IMF held back: it would wait for “a clear, detailed Greek debt 
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restructuring plan.”161 This was a principled position that might have produced 
better results had it come sooner. 
IMF staff had a hard enough time negotiating Greek program parameters 
with euro area institutions when private investors’ money was on the line; with 
euro area taxpayers as the dominant creditors, the political challenge was nearly 
insurmountable.162 At the outset, program parameters had to be settled with 
euro area institutions first, leaving little room for Greek agency (or policy 
“ownership”)163 For their part, euro area leaders had left themselves limited 
scope to maneuver: after telling their citizens that EU treaties categorically 
barred public debt forgiveness, they had to choose between the prospect of 
outright default and a mix of transactional engineering, accounting gimmicks 
and wishful thinking about Greek citizens’ tolerance for more austerity.164 
More bilateral financing was unpalatable, but default was still unthinkable for 
fear of financial and political contagion. The search for alternatives had 
produced six years of crippling economic decline and political upheaval.165 
If the IMF proved to be a weak anchor, the Paris Club simply had no part 
of the Greek debt restructuring. While the Greek debt stock looked more and 
more like those of the poorest countries in the Paris Club, cut off from private 
markets, Europe insisted on handling Greece as a family affair.166 To lighten 
its debt service burden, euro area governments quietly extended repayment 
term to between fifteen and forty years, and lowered interest rates to 1.2 
percent on average; however, they stood firm against reducing principal 
claims.167 This approach might have relieved near-term liquidity pressures, but 
was not enough to alter the debt trajectory, nor to stop government-to-
government debt from fueling political fights that cast doubt over the viability 
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of the monetary union.168 
In contrast to the tortured path to official debt relief, the 2012 Greek bond 
restructuring was a brilliantly executed operation, at least on a technical level. 
Once it was launched, the deal was done, and done quickly. It covered a record-
breaking stock of debt, approximately €200 billion ($260 billion), and reduced 
the private debt burden by over fifty percent.169 The smooth execution was 
mostly attributable to the fact that more than ninety percent of the bonds were 
governed by Greek law and could be amended retroactively by statute.170 The 
Greek Bondholder Act enabled the government to call a single vote of all its 
Greek-law bond holders, with quorum and voting thresholds set low at fifty 
percent and 66 2/3 percent, respectively, to ensure success.171 The voting 
mechanism in Greek retroactive legislation was fundamentally unlike then-
standard contractual CACs: the law was designed ex post to prevent individual 
bond series from dropping out and free-riding on the rest. CACs incorporated 
in contracts ex ante had always allowed some bonds to drop out. The single 
stock-wide vote legislated in Greece meant that either all or none of the bonds 
polled were bound to restructure. 
Greece got much less benefit from the CACs already incorporated in its 
foreign-law bond contracts.172 As noted in Part II, such CACs had been held up 
as a bulwark against free-riders in G-7 statements and G-10 reports since the 
mid-1990s.173 As was customary at the time, CACs in Greek bond contracts 
governed by English and Swiss law applied only to individual bond series. 
Holdouts secured blocking positions in more than half of the series by number. 
The restructuring vote failed for approximately forty-four percent of foreign-
law principal outstanding. 174  Private creditors holding €6.4 billion ($8.3 
billion) in bonds kept their old bonds and have been paid on schedule since.175 
The 2012 restructuring also caused controversy for excluding €56.7 
billion ($73.7 billion) in bonds held by the ECB and national central banks in 
the euro area.176 The ECB was Greece’s largest bondholder and the biggest 
holdout. The exclusion of central bank holdings sent the signal that some 
official creditors would get paid first even when their contracts were identical 
to those of private creditors, and threatened to make official support 
 
 168. See, e.g., Jason Hovet, Czech President Floats Idea of Greece Paying Debts by Hosting 
Migrant Centers, REUTERS (Andrew Bolton ed., Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-europe-migrants-czech-president-idUSKCN0W80KJ; Yanis Varoufakis, Germany Won’t Spare Greek 
Pain—It Has an Interest in Breaking Us, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2015/jul/10/germany-greek-pain-debt-relief-grexit. 
 169. Greece Autopsy, supra note 166, at 2. 
 170. Greece Autopsy, supra note 166. Retroactive legislation superimposed a majority voting 
mechanism on the entire stock of domestic-law bonds. Although it was enacted after consultations with 
creditors, it was in no way contractual – neither consensual nor market standard. The thresholds were 
designed to ensure that dissenting creditors would be outvoted by a combination of Greek and other euro 
area banks. 
 171. Id. at 11-12. 
 172. Id. at 42. 
 173. See supra Part II. 
 174. Greece Autopsy, supra note 166. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 15, 28. 
80 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE [Vol. 41: 2 
 
synonymous with subordination in the eyes of such creditors.177 To diffuse 
market fears that could undermine its emergency interventions, the ECB later 
promised that its new financing would be pari passu with the debt owed to 
private creditors.178 This promise has not been tested. 
In sum, the Greek experience implied that the IMF was weak, the Paris 
Club irrelevant, government creditors paralyzed by domestic politics, and 
CACs mostly futile. It highlighted a peculiar structure of accountability in crisis 
management institutions, which allowed Greece to accumulate unpayable debt 
at least in part thanks to their own inability to stop contagion and manage 
domestic politics in creditor countries. Echoing the experience of developing 
countries in the 1980s, Greece took on more and more debt at least in part 
because the international financial architecture was unequipped to process its 
default. 
The IMF responded to the controversy surrounding its Greek programs, 
and to a lesser extent Argentina, with an effort to recapture policy initiative 
beginning in 2013.179 Most importantly, in January 2016, the Executive Board 
did away with the systemic risk exception that had allowed the IMF to lend to 
Greece despite its questionable debt profile.180 It also expressly broadened the 
range of restructuring outcomes IMF staff could seek when a country’s debt 
sustainability was in doubt—effectively loosening the 2002 lending policy with 
its heavy emphasis on achieving sustainability.181 This implied that in some 
cases, private creditors would be asked to maintain their exposure to the 
distressed country as a condition of IMF support for the country, as they had 
done on several occasions before 2002.  
The revised policy also suggested that other governments—not the 
IMF—should finance a country like Greece on below-market terms to stem 
contagion.182  Disclaiming responsibility for fighting contagion might help 
reduce political pressure on the IMF to lend to over-indebted countries.183 
However, unless other parts of the global financial system take on the task, the 
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pressure is likely to return in the next crisis.184 As a membership organization 
with a crisis-fighting mandate, the IMF could find it hard to resist. 
C. Ukraine  
A political and economic crisis in Ukraine beginning in late 2013 again 
forced the IMF to deal with the breakdown of old debt restructuring modules. 
This time, the vanishing boundary between official and private debt presented 
the biggest problem. 
The IMF approved a $17 billion lending program for Ukraine in April 
2014, soon after the ouster of former President Viktor Yanukovych and 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, when the eastern part of the country erupted in 
conflict with Russian-backed rebels.185 Unlike Greece, Ukraine presented little 
risk of contagion. Moreover, the IMF was by far the biggest source of financing 
for the program. The IMF did not ask for a debt restructuring this time because 
it judged Ukraine’s debt, then less than 50 percent of its GDP, “sustainable 
with high probability” subject to “uncertainties that come from the 
geopolitics.”186 Less than a year later, Ukraine asked its creditors for forty 
percent debt reduction under a new IMF program that deemed its debt patently 
unsustainable. 
The episode again underscored the risk of turning the IMF staff debt 
sustainability analysis (DSA) into a formal gateway for large-scale packages: it 
made complex, multi-factor calculations that mixed art and science 187 
politically salient, and associated them with binary determinations (lend/not 
lend, restructure/not restructure).  
The tendency to shape analysis to lending imperatives was hardly new, 
but the stakes were higher, and the process more visible with a mandatory, 
formal policy. The analysis itself grew more rigorous and elaborate; however, 
its most visible use was in the service of the lending policy. This fed suspicions 
of analytical bias especially in strategically important cases like Ukraine, or 
systemically important ones like Greece. It also anchored market expectations 
about IMF actions, and sent market participants off to construct matrices 
matching DSA profiles to likely IMF restructuring demands.188 These efforts 
to map future IMF actions with precision in a world of uncertainty and 
discretion were bound to over-interpret, and likely to disappoint. 
Having asked Ukraine to restructure its foreign bonds in 2015, the IMF 
became implicated in two fights: one with Ukraine’s private creditors and 
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another with Russia. If Ukraine complied with economic reform conditionality 
and engaged with its creditors in good faith, but the creditors refused to 
restructure, the IMF could “lend into arrears” and back the government’s threat 
to stop paying.189 But one of the biggest bondholders was Russia, an IMF 
member whose sovereign wealth fund had bought an entire $3 billion 
Ukrainian bond issue in late 2013 to support Yanukovych.190 The bond was an 
ordinary tradable obligation governed by English law, albeit paying less than 
half the market interest rate at the time; it came due at the end of 2015 and 
represented the biggest debt payment during the IMF program.191 
In a world of pristinely compartmentalized debt restructuring modules, 
private bondholders might have been offered a debt exchange, while Russia 
might have restructured its debt in the Paris Club as part of a grand political 
bargain. In today’s world, Russia had initially refused to include the $3 billion 
Ukrainian bond in its Paris Club accounting—and also refused to participate in 
a bond exchange alongside private creditors. With any other recalcitrant 
bondholder, Ukraine could have taken advantage of the IMF’s policy on 
lending into arrears.192 However, this policy did not apply to government 
creditors, for whom the rule was “non-toleration” of arrears.193 IMF had tried 
to align the two policies from the start in 1989, but bilateral creditors who 
dominate its Executive Board were loath to give up an enforcement channel. 
Russia’s refusal to restructure and Ukraine’s refusal to pay Russia in full thus 
threatened to undermine the program. 
Backed by the IMF’s threat to lend into arrears, Ukraine convinced most 
of its private bondholders to settle for approximately twenty percent debt 
reduction, along with an extension of maturities, in a September 2015 debt 
exchange.194 Some creditors who held bonds coming due in the near term 
extracted a larger settlement after threatening to vote their blocking position 
against Ukraine’s offer in selected bond series with CACs.195 However, Russia 
was the bigger problem, since it held 100 percent of its bond issue and refused 
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to participate altogether.196 
In the standoff with Ukraine, Russia had the benefit of a private bond 
contract, which allowed it to sue Ukraine in English courts or bring a case 
against Ukraine before an arbitration tribunal. The contract itself had a number 
of unusual terms that gave bondholders more power over Ukraine than did any 
of the other Ukrainian Eurobonds. For as long as it held the bond, Russia also 
could take advantage of the IMF’s non-toleration policy with respect to official 
arrears. In other words, the bond could be private or official debt, depending on 
the context and the argument that Russia chose to use on any given day.197 
The IMF’s Executive Board voted to revise the non-toleration policy on 
December 8, 2015, just before the $3 billion bond came due.198 It was widely 
reported that the policy change was driven entirely by Russia’s holdings of 
Ukraine’s bonds. As noted earlier, IMF staff had tried to align the policies on 
official and private creditors back in 1989, and again in the spring of 2013 (six 
months before Russia bought the Eurobond from Ukraine), 199  but faced 
resistance from official bilateral creditors on its board. The fact that staff finally 
changed the policy more than a quarter century after the initial attempt speaks 
above all to the changing architecture of sovereign debt restructuring: the IMF 
could no longer count on the Paris Club to coordinate all the relevant official 
creditors.200 
The revised policy transformed non-toleration into lending into arrears, 
but it also ended the implicit assumption that the Paris Club could deliver 
adequate official debt relief, either directly or through comparability. Going 
forward, the IMF would only rely on Paris Club restructuring assurances if the 
Club represented a substantial proportion of the creditors, and would seek 
assurances from non-members where Paris Club debt was small by 
comparison. 201  If non-member governments refused to restructure despite 
good-faith efforts on the part of the debtor, the IMF could lend into arrears, so 
long as doing so would not harm the IMF’s ability to mobilize government 
financing in the future. The proviso on the need to mobilize official funds 
works as a safety valve; in a future crisis, it would allow the IMF to 
accommodate big non-Paris Club lenders such as China.202 
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The upshot of the change for Ukraine was simple: once the IMF staff 
determined that Ukraine complied with its reform conditions and had reached 
out to Russia in good faith, the government could stop paying the Eurobond 
without fearing for its IMF program disbursements. 203  Ukraine promptly 
defaulted on Russia three weeks later.204  In February 2016, Russia sued 
Ukraine for full repayment in an English court, claiming among other things 
that Ukraine did not negotiate in good faith.205 
The lawsuit continues at this writing. In Ukraine as in Argentina, national 
courts sitting in one-off contract disputes were effectively asked to referee a 
political conflict and a macroeconomic crisis, and, in the case of Ukraine, a 
military confrontation, all wrapped into one. Bankruptcy courts have much 
more elaborate toolkits, but are rarely asked to dabble in military conflict 
resolution. Ukraine’s most morally intuitive defense is that it should not have to 
pay a creditor that invaded it, and that is at least arguably responsible for its 
dire economic condition. Such arguments can be refashioned into claims of 
duress and impracticability, grounded in common law contract doctrine—
which is just what Ukraine tried to do in its answer to Russia’s complaint.206 
Ukraine could also argue that the $3 billion bond was a tainted, illegitimate 
transaction to prop up a kleptocratic leader friendly to Russia.207 In either case, 
judges interpreting a garden-variety Eurobond contract must implicitly rule on 
the legitimacy of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the extent of its military 
involvement in eastern Ukraine.208 These are precisely the sorts of questions 
that judges sitting in commercial cases prefer to avoid by enforcing contracts as 
written, questions that are especially hard to answer in a regime that lacks a 
shared normative core. 
In the old modular regime, where national courts played a relatively 
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minor role compared to other institutional actors, such as the IMF, the Paris 
Club, and the London Club—and where governments did not sue each other on 
bond contracts—the dearth of shared norms might have been a manageable 
problem. Repeat players could resolve conflicts ad hoc in their respective 
modules, without explicitly invoking big ideas such as equality or good faith. 
The regime’s failure to develop shared norms begins to bite when the informal 
institutional framework falls apart, and national courts take on a bigger role. In 
Argentina and Ukraine alike, courts could use guidance on the meaning of 
equality and good faith in sovereign debt practice, but such guidance is hard to 
come by because participants in the restructuring process often disagree on first 
principles. 
IV. NOW WHAT? 
Sovereign debt restructuring has always been a flawed enterprise. It 
would be wrong to describe the 1980s and the 1990s as the halcyon days of 
debt relief and burden-sharing. Agreements took years to negotiate and failed to 
secure a durable exit from debt crises. There were endless iterations of 
piecemeal relief and painful adjustment. But by the end of the twentieth 
century, debt crises unfolded in a regime that had its own structure and 
customs, and exerted a measure of discipline over its constituents within an 
IMF-centered analytical framework, thanks to cohesion within the restructuring 
modules and cross-conditionality among them. Modular structure and 
pragmatic focus made this regime resilient: creditors could come and go, but 
the overall framework would stay more-or-less as depicted in Figure 1. Yet it 
was unintelligible to all but a small core of specialists and often unaccountable 
to the lending and borrowing public. 
Restructurings in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine exposed a regime in 
disarray. Modules dissolved, cross-conditionality fell by the wayside, and 
public and private creditors showed little commitment to the old processes, 
practices, and institutions. Anyone could be a free-rider, and in the high-profile 
cases, free-riding demonstrably paid off.209 The IMF and national courts had to 
manage the consequences of more coordination failures, although neither was 
fully equipped for the task. Debt fueled street protests and political crises. It 
was high time for reform. 
Initiatives poured in from different corners of the sovereign debt universe. 
The IMF launched a comprehensive review of sovereign debt restructuring in 
2013, including proposals to reform its analysis and lending policies.210 The 
U.N. General Assembly called for a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring 
framework in September 2014, and endorsed a set of “Basic Principles” for 
sovereign debt restructuring a year later.211 The resolutions built on a multi-
year work program at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), which also produced a restructuring “roadmap” for sovereign 
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debtors.212 ICMA proposed new contract reforms in August 2014, including 
stock-wide aggregated majority voting adapted from the 2012 Greek 
Bondholder Law. “Super-aggregated” CACs were a product of ICMA’s 
collaboration with other industry bodies, large emerging market debtors, the 
IMF and official bilateral creditors.213 
At least on their face, these initiatives were compatible, even 
complementary. Nonetheless, old rivalries threatened to block the emergence of 
a viable alternative to the old regime. The G-7 and a handful of other 
governments refused to engage in the U.N. debate for fear that it would create 
an opening for treaty-based bankruptcy and erode the IMF’s role in sovereign 
debt restructuring. This was a plausible concern, since for some governments 
and civil society groups, treaty-based bankruptcy and formal institutions remain 
the only acceptable outcome.214 However, arguments pitting contract against 
bankruptcy, market participants against officials, and the IMF against the 
United Nations have raged for decades. Meanwhile, sovereign debt 
restructuring has remained a pragmatic mix of contract, treaty, and politics. 
This is unlikely to change overnight. 
Reform requires re-imagining the architecture of sovereign debt 
restructuring as a coherent whole, but one that need not reside in a single 
formal institution or legal process. For example, debt restructuring in the mid-
1990s used modules and links among them to approximate elements of 
comprehensive and collective restructuring in bankruptcy, and to limit free-
riding. The modular structure also made it easier to combine elements of treaty, 
contract, and institutional practice in a single process.215 But it failed to deliver 
sustainable outcomes broadly accepted as fair by its constituents. A reformed 
regime should achieve better outcomes in a more accountable process, even as 
it works to make up for the loss of the old coordination tools. I sketch a series 
of contractual, statutory, and institutional reforms reflecting these objectives in 
the remainder of Part IV. 
A. Sustainable and Fair Outcomes 
The existing regime tends to approach debt sustainability as a fact, an 
ascertainable threshold: an economy’s debt stock or debt service burden is 
either stable and payable, or doomed to keep growing. As noted earlier, this 
threshold can be hard to calculate with precision; however, the basic idea is 
relatively straightforward. It is generally understood, but less commonly 
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discussed, that sustainability is also a political judgment about distribution of 
resources between debtors and creditors, and among different creditors with 
claims on the sovereign. A sovereign debtor allocates political capital, reform 
efforts and budget resources across a range of priorities that might include 
veterans’ pensions, foreign bond payments, domestic bank bailouts, girls’ 
education, and gold statues of military leaders. A government creditor chooses 
to lend its crisis-stricken neighbor billions of dollars to pay off its bonds, to 
reform, to restructure or some combination. In all cases, achieving 
sustainability requires political support from the government’s domestic 
constituents and foreign creditors, since it implies distribution on a substantial 
scale. 
Because they implicate sensitive political judgments, IMF staff should not 
be the sole source of debt sustainability determinations. It is risky and 
potentially counterproductive to put the entire weight of sustainability politics 
on the IMF, notwithstanding its analytical resources and experience. The crises 
in Greece and Ukraine illustrate how DSA politics can threaten the IMF’s 
credibility, and cast doubt on its impartiality. Especially since it is no longer 
prudent to assume that all future restructurings would be anchored in the IMF, 
it is important to build consensus around debt sustainability methodology, 
including the range of assumptions that might go into a model, and to harness 
independent analytical capacity outside the Fund, which could be mobilized in 
crisis and be accepted by the relevant constituents. 
For example, sustainability determinations could be made by standing or 
ad hoc expert panels, drawn from agreed lists including market, civil society, 
and public sector representatives. Such panels may consider data and other 
input from IMF staff, peer governments, market and academic experts. A 
representative working group under the auspices of the IMF or another 
multilateral body can develop and periodically review the substantive 
methodology, and agree on rules for constituting panels. Panel determinations 
of sustainability need not be binding. However, debtors and creditors may wish 
to incorporate them by reference in their contracts and policies, to reduce 
uncertainty in the event of a crisis. 
IMF DSAs can and should continue to play an internal role at the Fund, 
for example, to assess the risk of a program to the IMF’s own resources. This 
determination is distinct from whether a country should borrow or restructure, 
and on what terms—and would benefit from being made separately. Put 
differently, it is plausible for the IMF, the sovereign borrower, and its creditors 
to reach different conclusions about what is achievable and desirable, taking 
both politics and economics into account. Each may come to the table with 
different assessments and different normative priors. IMF staff may well decide 
that the sovereign’s analysis does not add up. In that case, the IMF should not 
lend. If no other funding is available, the government may default or 
restructure; it may also continue to engage with the IMF to arrive at a 
consensus analysis. However, it is also possible that other financing sources 
would materialize, especially if the IMF is capacity constrained.216 Abstaining 
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from a program that might strain its analytical credibility should bolster the 
IMF’s position in a more diverse field of creditors, and preserve its resources—
perhaps even to fight contagion. 
Sovereigns should make greater use of contingent contracts with both 
private and official creditors. A substantial economic literature has advocated 
debt contracts that link repayment to macroeconomic factors.217 For sovereign 
borrowers, such contracts might provide for standstills and predetermined relief 
in a financial crisis; creditors could also get higher payments in good times. 
Contingent contracts can function as a form of equity capital,218 or as insurance 
against default, where the creditors may charge in advance for giving up 
payments when the government is in distress. Contracts with well-designed 
contingency triggers can reduce the overall risk of sovereign default, benefiting 
creditors as a group and reducing the cost of borrowing.219 
A distinct advantage of contingent contracts in sovereign debt is that they 
secure a measure of ex ante political buy-in from foreign creditors, who can get 
an equity-like stake in a country’s economy that is typically inaccessible to 
non-residents. At least for private creditors, contract design and price in this 
case could imply a view of sustainability (when a country needs relief), and an 
agreement on distribution of losses ex post (how much relief). The challenge is 
to design triggers that minimize incentives for the borrowing government to 
cheat (for example, by misreporting statistics), and a range of outcomes that 
would be accepted in a particular set of crisis circumstances that is hard to 
specify ahead of time. 
Contingent sovereign debt contracts with official creditors can either 
mimic private contracts, or serve a different function altogether. As for the 
former, it may be politically difficult for a government to pre-commit its 
taxpayers to finance another government in crisis on a large scale. On the other 
hand, there is a distinct argument for tying a small portion of any policy-based 
loan to the achievement of the stated policy goals, or at least to the robustness 
of assumptions underlying the policy conditions. The role of contingency in 
this case is not so much to provide relief, but to promote accountability on the 
part of the lending government both to its own population, and to the borrower. 
In the current regime, the borrower bears the risk of poor policy design and 
implementation. Taking a lesson from Greece since 2010, contingent debt 
contracts could make it harder for an official creditor to lend on patently 
incredible assumptions about the borrower’s ability to adjust, while telling its 
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taxpayers that the debt was certain to be repaid. The contingent portion should 
be small, to minimize perverse incentives for the debtor to abandon reform to 
get debt relief—and so as not to discourage government-to-government lending 
altogether. However, even a small amount may be enough to get the attention 
of the lending government’s constituents, and help hold it accountable. 
Although academics heavily favor contingent contracts, they have been 
rare in practice. Countries have issued debt indexed to their export 
commodities, as well as debt with value recovery features, issued as part of a 
debt restructuring.220 On the other hand, sovereign debt contracts that reduce 
payments in response to negative macroeconomic shocks are rare. In light of 
the strong theoretical case in favor, further research into the causes of market 
resistance is in order. In the meantime, policy measures to encourage 
contingent contracts can include exempting them from the IMF’s lending into 
arrears policy and, where relevant, from Paris Club comparability requirements, 
provided they deliver relief broadly in line with the agreed program.221 
Sovereigns and their creditors should invest in developing shared debt 
restructuring norms. The demise of modules and cross-conditionality revealed 
a normative gap at the heart of the sovereign debt restructuring regime. 
Creditors in their respective modules might have shared views on what 
constituted equitable treatment and good faith negotiation; however, there was 
no such consensus for the regime as a whole. As the modules weakened, this 
has led to dramatically disparate recoveries by creditors holding similar claims 
in Argentina, but also in Greece, and in Ukraine. To the extent the relationships 
among modules reflected an implicit priority structure in sovereign debt, it too 
was unraveling.222 The rise of sovereign debt contract lawsuits in national 
courts exacerbated the problem: by mandate, courts pursue piecemeal 
resolution of contract disputes, not comprehensive resolution of financial 
crises. It is an inhospitable setting for the development of shared norms. 
The Basic Principles for sovereign debt restructuring endorsed by the 
General Assembly are well-placed to fill the gap in the old regime, and to guide 
judicial discretion in sovereign debt lawsuits. In particular, Principles 5 and 8, 
along with the emphasis on majority restructuring in Principle 9, reflect 
substantial international consensus on equity and sustainability in restructuring. 
They begin to elaborate broadly-held values that should be uncontroversial, 
such as good faith and majority voting, inclusiveness, transparency and 
sustainability. They also include more specific guidance, for example, 
reiterating the imperative to construe exceptions to sovereign immunity 
narrowly.  
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If governments and their creditors use and invoke these principles when 
they restructure, they can infuse them with practical meaning and make them 
effectively binding. Over time, these principles can contribute to a richer 
understanding of equal treatment for similarly situated claims on the sovereign, 
and help develop a generally accepted priority structure, which could be 
incorporated in contracts or gradually become custom, binding on the courts. If 
they are used widely, invoked and elaborated in context, like elements of the 
old modular regime, the principles could begin exerting a compliance pull of 
their own: they would be useful to the stakeholders and compelling to the 
courts. 
With its universal membership, the U.N. General Assembly is a familiar 
source of international legal norms. As a high-level political body, it is an 
unlikely place to hash out technical design particulars for a sovereign 
bankruptcy treaty. Governments that voted against or abstained from voting on 
the sovereign debt resolutions would benefit from more active engagement: it 
would give them a voice in norm elaboration, especially valuable since they 
can no longer count on remaining dominant among the creditors.  
B. A Comprehensive, Collective Framework 
The decline of modules and cross-conditionality has the biggest impact 
on creditor coordination. As noted earlier, it has opened new free-riding 
opportunities for public and private creditors alike, and has introduced more 
arbitrariness in enforcement against debtors—best illustrated by the court-
imposed global boycott of Argentina for the benefit of a few holdout creditors. 
A new approach to inter-creditor discipline and enforcement is in order. 
Financial industry groups should work with sovereign borrowers to 
advance contract reform and more robust standardization. There is already 
broad consensus in favor of ICMA proposals for stock-wide aggregated CACs, 
and for changing pari passu clauses in sovereign bonds so that they could not 
be used to impose drastic remedies of the sort seen in Argentina. The IMF, the 
G-20, and the U.N. General Assembly, in Principle 9 of the Basic Principles, 
have all endorsed these contract reforms, which can go a long way to 
eliminating free-riders if used stock-wide. While new clauses have been 
incorporated in more than half of the new foreign-law bonds issued since the 
ICMA proposal, a number of sovereigns have expressed reservations about 
changing their contracts. New issues with enhanced contracts also represent a 
tiny fraction of the more than $900 billion in foreign bonds outstanding, and 
nearly a third of the total do not mature for more than ten years. 223 
Approximately 60 percent of all new issues in the year following ICMA’s 
recommendations used the new clauses.224 Moreover, sovereign debt contracts 
have never been entirely standardized. Idiosyncratic variations in both old and 
enhanced contracts raise the risk of interpretation error, which could undermine 
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the goals of contract reform.225 
While debtors and creditors should have the ability to negotiate non-
standard contract terms, inadvertent idiosyncratic variation presents a risk to 
the system. The risk is higher if judges follow in the steps of recent U.S. federal 
court decisions against Argentina, and impose injunctions targeting third parties 
in an effort to influence immune sovereign debtors. ICMA and other industry 
groups, perhaps with support from the official sector, should explore the scope 
for further standardization. For example, instead of issuing a handbook of 
model terms that are adopted piecemeal, ICMA could follow the derivatives 
industry model, and publish contracts for wholesale adoption, with non-
standard variations contained in side documents. Since the 1980s, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has published a 
growing suite of such agreements, which govern relationships among 
participants in derivatives markets.226 In addition to creating a strong standard 
default option for contract design, where parties must make an effort to depart 
from ISDA texts, the derivatives industry approach makes it easier to deal with 
the outstanding debt stock. Instead of amending every contract separately, 
market participants can simply accede to a “protocol” issued by ISDA, which 
has the effect of incorporating the amendment contained in the protocol across 
their entire suite of ISDA documents. 
An alternative approach to encouraging contract reform and 
standardization is to appeal to payment and clearing utilities, which have been 
repeatedly targeted in holdout litigation, including against Argentina. 
Systemically important payment and clearing institutions such as DTCC and 
Euroclear remain vulnerable to court injunctions from individual enforcement. 
They can protect themselves, for example, by charging more to clear bonds for 
sovereigns that do not use robust aggregated CACs or ICMA-style pari passu 
clauses. This would encourage sovereigns to turn over their debt stock more 
quickly by imposing transaction costs for failure to reform. 
Private and official creditors should invest in developing best practices to 
promote inter-creditor coordination. In addition to standardizing contracts, 
industry groups should consider non-contractual reforms to promote inter-
creditor coordination. In particular, they could develop best practices for the 
appointment and operation of creditor committees, in cooperation with 
sovereign debt issuers and their advisers. A “best practices” document would 
add more value than contract clauses providing for creditor committees, which 
have been controversial, 227  because it could address a broad range of 
contingencies, and evolve over time to address specific problems that come up 
in restructurings. Such a document also could serve as evidence of trade usage 
in the event of a court dispute involving committee operation. 
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Other norms and practices in need of elaboration concern bond trustees. 
In bonds issued under a trust indenture rather than fiscal agency agreement, the 
enforcement power rests with the trustee for the benefit of all bondholders. 
Individual bondholders cannot sue unless the trustee fails to do so after being 
offered adequate indemnification. As a result, sovereign bond trustees have 
worked well as barriers to lawsuits, but they have generally failed to facilitate 
engagement between the debtor and its creditors. Sovereign bond trustees have 
a long history of passivity that has prompted creditor complaints and official 
reform initiatives since the 1930s.228  Investing trustees with more power and 
responsibility may contribute over time to the transformation of their role in 
sovereign debt and make them more expensive. In most cases, such insurance 
against individual enforcement would benefit the debtor and creditors as a 
group. 
The rise of new creditors and forms of financing that mix trade, 
investment, and finance, elevates the importance of consistent accounting and 
reporting. If liberalization trends continue, it will get harder and harder to 
categorize a debt instrument as official, private, domestic, or external. Private 
financial industry groups, official creditors, including the IMF and the Paris 
Club, but also the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds,229 would 
benefit from comparing notes on their respective accounting conventions and 
reporting requirements. Unless such groups cooperate in this apparently 
mundane task, more creditors would try to replicate Russia’s strategy in 
Ukraine, characterizing the same debt in multiple ways in order to free-ride on 
other creditors’ concessions. 
Because official and private creditors are now more likely to hold 
identical contract claims on a sovereign—as in the case of Russia’s Ukrainian 
Eurobond and central bank holdings of Greek government debt—both sets of 
creditors should invest in developing a shared understanding of how such 
claims would be treated in a restructuring. The experience in Greece and 
Ukraine suggest that creditors with fundamentally different incentives should 
be discouraged from participating side by side in the same bond restructuring 
vote. To that end, all bonds held by official creditors should either be 
disenfranchised, or at a minimum segregated in their own voting pool.230 
Market utilities should be insulated from free-riding by creditors, and 
should be off limits to debtors in extreme cases of abuse. Global injunctions 
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against Argentina have put market utilities at the center of sovereign debt 
enforcement, and at risk of disruption by holdout lawsuits. Treaties, regulatory 
norms, and national legislation should shield payment and clearing systems 
from being commandeered for the benefit of individual creditors or groups of 
creditors.231 Regulatory coordination fora such as the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) or the Committee on Financial Market Infrastructures can put forward 
standards for immunizing financial market infrastructure from disruption for 
private debt enforcement. 232  Such standards would address the risk of 
destabilizing systemically important market infrastructure for the sake of the 
free-rider, at the expense of creditors as a group and third parties. 
However, in truly exceptional cases where a sovereign has engaged in 
abusive behavior or has defrauded creditors as a group, then treaty, legislative, 
or regulatory sanctions could put market infrastructure off limits to it—as they 
are off limits to illicit payment flows. Determinations of fraud and bad faith 
could be made by national courts or international bodies, provided, however, 
that they are made for the benefit of the entire body of creditors, not individual 
free-riders. 
C. An Accountable Process 
Sovereign debt restructuring experience must be accessible and 
intelligible to the public. This is entirely consistent with the principles of 
transparency and legitimacy endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly 
(Principles 3 and 7) and should be simple to implement in practice. Of all the 
proposals in this Part IV, this is the easiest to implement, and likely to have a 
significant long-term impact.233 It is also unglamorous. 
Any international organization, trade or civil society group can host a 
comprehensive, searchable public database of past restructurings, including 
financial and legal terms, the treatment of public, private, domestic and foreign 
claims, and any underlying assumptions—made available as soon as practicable 
after the agreement is finalized. The sovereign borrower should be responsible 
for supplying required information in standardized form within a prescribed 
period after a restructuring transaction is completed. At least basic summary 
terms should be available in English and in the language of the borrowing 
country. The requirement to disclose restructuring terms can be incorporated in 
standard form debt contracts, as well as IMF and other institutional lending 
policies. Failure to deliver information to the repository within a reasonable 
period without a compelling justification could give rise to sanctions, including 
claw backs of restructuring concessions in extreme cases, such as fraud. 
Beyond ex post public disclosure of restructuring experience, borrowing 
governments should, as a rule, disclose in advance to their creditors the 
restructuring terms applicable to all of their external and domestic creditors. 
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Such disclosure is already required under the ICMA model, and would 
contribute to process transparency, consistent with Basic Principle 3 of the 
UNGA Resolution. The goal is to promote equity among the relevant 
stakeholders, judged by a shared standard. To foster adoption and compliance 
with all disclosure standards, the extent to which a sovereign abides by 
industry-norm contract and institutional commitments in this area should form 
part of the IMF’s good faith determination in its policy on lending into arrears. 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereign debt crises are, by definition, systemic financial and political 
crises in the borrowing country. They could never be orderly or predictable in 
the strict sense. Sovereign debt restructurings in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries have had a remarkable track record of operational success and 
substantive failure. Deals got done, but few debtors got timely and durable 
relief. The informal, modular regime with the IMF at the center, which has 
dominated sovereign debt restructuring since the 1980s, is now under stress as 
a result of changing patterns of international capital flows, the rise of new 
creditors, and old stakeholder disinvestment. Government, market, and civil 
society groups have put forward a slew of reform proposals. 
Reforms must address both the perennial flaws of the old regime, and the 
gaps left by its demise. They should strive to achieve sustainable and fair 
distribution, a comprehensive and collective restructuring framework, and an 
intelligible, accountable process. The success of any new regime will depend in 
important part on its stakeholders’ ability to develop shared norms, perhaps 
starting from the Basic Principles endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in 
September 2015. The IMF likely will continue to anchor sovereign debt 
restructurings, but its role cannot be taken for granted given the size of its 
resources relative to global capital flows, and uncertainty about potential 
response to contagion. 
For the foreseeable future, sovereign debt restructurings will happen in 
hybrid institutional arrangements, with some of the old restructuring modules 
potentially gaining a new lease on life, and others withering away. The regime 
will continue as part-statute, part-contract, guided by a mix of rules, principles, 
and constrained discretion. The challenge is to make the pieces add up to a 
reasonably coherent whole that meets the needs of its constituents—pensioners 
with their life savings in government bonds and workers whose taxes repay 
them—and convinces them to embrace its outcomes. 
This essay has sketched several incremental steps to advance this goal. 
Among other things, I advocate creating independent capacity for debt 
sustainability analysis with input from and alongside the IMF, for much greater 
contract standardization on the derivatives industry model, for deep 
coordination among public and private creditor groups to discourage free-
riders, for shielding market infrastructure from enforcement for the benefit of 
individual creditors, and, most immediately, for standardized and publicly 
accessible disclosure of restructuring experience. I also argue for elaborating a 
common set of norms to guide national court decisions, including a richer view 
of equity and priority, so that judges are more likely to rule for the benefit of a 
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broader set of stakeholders in sovereign debt restructuring, rather than an 
enterprising set of plaintiffs free-riding on the rest. Taken together, these 
proposals describe elements of a debt restructuring regime that should address 
concerns expressed by debtors and creditors, reflect changes in international 
finance and politics since 1990, and serve as a platform to develop shared 
values underpinning further reform of the regime and its institutions. 
 
